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Note
The Tragedy of Central European University:
Theorizing Hungarian Illiberal Democracy and Its
Threat to Academic Freedom
JESSICA M. ZACCAGNINO
The global proliferation of radical right political movements and the decline
of democracy are defining features of our current moment. Authoritarian leaders
ascend to power through the ballot box, but at once, they systematically
consolidate control over the state and civil society. Hungarian Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz party is emblematic of illiberal democracy, a term
originally coined by Fareed Zakaria. This Note applies Zakaria’s illiberal
democracy to Hungary while adjusting the contours of his theory to better account
for the role of anti-intellectualism and nationalism in the illiberal toolkit. This
Note also investigates the Orbán government’s targeting of Central European
University, one of the most notorious struggles between a university and an
illiberal democracy for academic freedom. Central European University’s
situation illuminates the ways in which illiberal régimes attempt to smother spaces
of resistance, using ethno-nationalist rhetoric to characterize universities and
intellectuals as outsider threats to the illiberal nation-state.
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The Tragedy of Central European University:
Theorizing Hungarian Illiberal Democracy and Its
Threat to Academic Freedom
JESSICA M. ZACCAGNINO *
Every age has its own Fascism, and we see the warning signs
wherever the concentration of power denies citizens the
possibility and the means of expressing and acting on their
own free will.
Ogni tempo ha il suo fascismo: se ne notano i segni
premonitori dovunque la contrentrazione di potere nega al
cittadino la possibilità e la capacità di esprimere ed attuare
la sua volontà.
—Primo Levi1
INTRODUCTION
Far-right political parties have grown their influence globally by
winning major, divisive elections in both recently democratized states and
states that have long been considered cornerstones of liberal democracy.2
Many of these parties emerged as a reaction to international unrest,
including sweeping recessions and refugee crises. Guided by nationalism
and populism, the far-right has shaken democracy to its core. Political
parties such as Hungary’s Fidesz and Jobbik, Poland’s Law and Justice,
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, LL.M. Candidate, Human Rights & Social Justice;
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D 2020; Bard College, B.A. 2017. I am incredibly grateful
to my advisor, Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez, without whom I could not have properly theorized
this Note. I would also like to thank Professor Michael Fischl for his invaluable advice throughout the
drafting process. I am forever indebted to the editors of the Connecticut Law Review, and like to thank
Jillian Chambers, Hannah Kalichman, Adam Kuegler, Alexandria Madjeric, Carolyn Rennie, and
Mallori Thompson in particular for their meticulous work, extraordinarily helpful feedback, and
friendship. Most importantly, I would like to thank my parents (Debra and Robert Zaccagnino),
grandparents (Anne and Robert Blackburn), sister (Melissa Zaccagnino), and partner (James Ninia) for
their never-ending support.
1
PRIMO LEVI, A Past We Thought Would Never Return, in THE BLACK HOLE OF AUSCHWITZ 31,
34 (Marco Belpoliti ed., Sharon Wood trans., 2005); PRIMO LEVI, Un passato che credevamo non
dovesse ritornare piú, in L’ASIMMETRIA E LA VITA: ARTICOLI E SAGGI 1955-1987, at 47, 50 (Marco
Belpoliti ed., 2002).
2
See, e.g., Europe and Right-Wing Nationalism: A Country-By-Country Guide, BBC (Nov. 13,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006 (surveying electoral gains made by
far-right parties in Europe).
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and Italy’s Lega Nord have quickly risen to prominence. Likewise,
far-right heads of government—including Donald Trump in the United
States of America, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
in Turkey—have swiftly gained power and begun to curb safeguards to
democracy, like free speech and electoral access.
In many of these cases, the current political climate can be explained
by the proliferation of illiberal democracy. Although illiberal democracies
may at first appear to be a functioning “democracy,” upon closer look, it
quickly becomes apparent that illiberal democracies are shells of their
“liberal” counterparts. 4 Illiberal democracies may retain some democratic
political liberties, like free elections or separation of powers, but they lack
strong protections of the civil liberties provided by constitutional
liberalism in liberal democracies. The rise of illiberal democracy in
Hungary, the focus of this Note, is perfectly illustrated by Fidesz’s ongoing
attempt to push Central European University into exile and other unilateral
attacks on academic freedom. In order to fully understand this complex
situation, one must look not only to democratic theory, but to the history of
Central Europe, Hungarian nationalism, and Fidesz’s manipulation of the
rule of law. This Note situates the Hungarian case as a cautionary tale and
attempts to comprehend how the trend of illiberal democracy can flourish
in the most prosperous age for democracy to date, using academic freedom
as a point of focus. Part I situates this global phenomenon within a
theoretical framework of democratic wave theory and illiberal democracy.
Part II applies Part I to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s rise to power in
Hungary. Finally, Part III analyzes how Hungarian illiberal democracy has
impacted academic freedom in the country.

3
See, e.g., Jens Becker, The Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Hungary, 13 SEER: J. FOR LAB. &
SOC. AFF. E. EUR. 29, 33 (2010) (“The European elections in 2009 had seen a writing on the wall
regarding the future crash of the left, with FIDESZ obtaining 56.4 per cent of the votes against MSZP’s
17.4 per cent. The elections of 2010 on 11 and 25 [of] April made this definitively clear.”); Michał
Słowikowski & Michał Pierzgalski, The Party System and Voting Behavior in Poland, in CIVIC AND
UNCIVIC VALUES IN POLAND: VALUE TRANSFORMATION, EDUCATION, AND CULTURE 41, 61 (Sabrina
P. Ramet et al. eds., 2019) (“After the elections of 2015, the largest party in the parliament is now Law
and Justice (PiS), which won an absolute majority of seats in both houses of the Polish parliament.”);
CATHERINE FIESCHI, POPULOCRACY: THE TYRANNY OF AUTHENTICITY AND THE RISE OF POPULISM
101 (2019) (“The year 2008 marks the beginning of populism’s full ideological development in Italy:
[Movimento Cinque Stelle] began to capitalize on the deep transformation of the voters through its use
of the Web, and the promise of a different, transparent and authentic bottom-up movement; while the
Lega began to transcend its geographical limits and move southward with the aim of conquering
Berlusconi strongholds through a discourse of common sense in the face of Italy’s main challenges . . .
.”).
4
Infra Part I.B.
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I. THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS: THE THIRD REVERSE WAVE, ILLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY, AND THE NATION-STATE
A. Democracy’s Third Reverse Wave
In 1991, Samuel P. Huntington posited that democratization occurs in
the form of waves. Huntington theorized that “[a] wave of democratization
is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that
occur within a specified period of time that significantly outnumber
transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time.”5 Under
Huntington’s wave theory, he also identifies the trend of the reverse wave.
After each wave of democratization, there is a reverse wave, under which
nation-states that “had previously made the transition to democracy
reverted to nondemocratic rule.”6 Huntington acknowledges that it would
be arbitrary to prescribe a rigid date range pinpointing each wave, but
nonetheless poses an approximate era for each wave.7 Huntington
subsequently proposes the following structure to describe the modern
situation of democracy:
First, long wave of democratization
First reverse wave
Second, short wave of democratization
Second reverse wave
Third wave of democratization.8
Huntington’s first wave of democratization was indeed long, spanning
between approximately 1828 to 1926.9 This first wave was influenced by
the American and French revolutions that took place nearly a century prior
and was defined by a substantial widening of suffrage, reduced plural
voting, and the secret ballot.10 Under this first wave, twenty-nine
democracies emerged. 11 The first reverse wave arrived in 1922 with
Mussolini’s (democratic) ascension to power and ended with the defeat of
the Axis forces in the Second World War.12 The first reverse wave was
characterized by “the shift away from democracy and either the return to
5
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 15 (1991).
6
Id. at 16.
7
Id. (“It is also arbitrary to attempt to specify precisely the dates of democratization waves and
reverse waves. It is, nonetheless, often useful to be arbitrary . . . .”).
8
Id.
9
Id. at 16–17.
10
Id. at 16.
11
Samuel P. Huntington, Democracy’s First Wave, 2 J. DEMOCRACY 12, 12 (1991).
12
HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 17–18.
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traditional forms of authoritarian rule or the introduction of new
mass-based, more brutal and pervasive forms of totalitarianism,”13 and
tended to occur in countries that had adopted democratic forms of
governance either before the First World War or during the interwar
period.14 Countries that experienced nondemocratic régime change
“reflected the rise of communist, fascist, and militaristic ideologies.”15
Even in countries where democracy remained in place, antidemocratic
movements gained strength.16
Huntington’s second wave of democratization followed the Allied
victory and extended until the early 1960s, where “Allied occupation
promoted inauguration of democratic institutions,”17 and fledgling
democracies emerged during the beginning of the end of colonialism.18
Contrary to Europe’s democracies remerging under Allied occupation, “no
real effort was made to introduce democratic institutions” during
decolonization in Africa and South Asia.19 This led to mixed results: while
some new states, such as Nigeria and India, established democracies that
were maintained for at least a decade, in other states, democracy was
tenuous and the institutions supporting it were shaky at best.20 By the late
1950s and early 1960s, the second wave of democracy had ebbed and
“political development[s] and regime transitions were taking on a heavily
authoritarian cast.”21 Latin America experienced numerous coups d’état,
primarily led by military régimes, which established bureaucratic
authoritarianism22 throughout the region.23 Similar military coups d’état
13

Id. at 17.
Id.
15
Id. at 18.
16
Id. (“In France, Britain, and other countries where democratic regimes remained in place,
antidemocratic movements gained strength from the alienation of the 1920s and the depression of the
1930s.”).
17
Id.
18
Id. at 19.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
The term “bureaucratic authoritarianism” was first coined by Guillermo O’Donnell in 1973 to
explain the novel type of military rule in Latin America.
14

This form of rule has been interpreted as distinctively bureaucratic because national
leadership was dominated by individuals who had risen to prominence not through
political careers but through bureaucratic careers in large public and private
organizations. . . . Decision-making styles among these leaders were commonly
technocratic. This bureaucratic, technocratic orientation was generally accompanied
by intense repression, which in most of the cases reached levels unprecedented in
the region.
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO POLITICS OF THE WORLD 93 (Joel Krieger ed., 2d ed. 2001). The
military-led coups in Brazil (1964), Chile (1973), and Argentina (1976) are all examples of
bureaucratic authoritarian military régimes. See, e.g., Remembering Brazil’s Military Coup 50 Years
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occurred throughout nations in Asia and the Mediterranean region. At the
same time, rapid decolonization caused democratic instability in new
nations: “Thirty-three other African countries that became independent
between 1956 and 1970 became authoritarian with independence or very
shortly after independence.”25 This era of decolonization led to the largest
multiplication of authoritarian régimes in history,26 accompanied by a
worldwide decline in democratic governments. One study estimates that
one third of the thirty-two functioning democracies in the world in 1958
had become authoritarian by the mid 1970s.27 Huntington argues that this
reverse wave was especially notable due to the fact that some nations
undergoing nondemocratic régime changes had sustained democracy for
over a quarter century.28
Huntington’s third and final democratic wave began with the
Portuguese Carnation Revolution of 1974 and extended through The Third
Wave’s publication in 1991.29 During this time period, approximately thirty
countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America replaced their authoritarian
régimes with democracies.30 The wave began in Southern European
nations—Portugal, Spain, Greece—and spread to the bureaucratic
authoritarian régimes in Latin America and the military dictatorships in
Asia throughout the 1970s and 1980s.31 By the end of the 1980s, “the
democratic wave engulfed the communist world.”32 After forty-five years
of Soviet occupation, Hungary transitioned to a multiparty system in

Later, NACLA (Apr. 1, 2014), https://nacla.org/news/2014/4/1/remembering-brazils-military-coup-50years-later (recounting Brazil’s military dictatorship); Daniel Sheehy, An Eyewitness Account of
Pinochet’s
Coup
45
Years
Ago,
SMITHSONIAN
MAG.
(Sept.
10,
2018),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/eyewitness-account-pinochets-coup-45years-ago-180970241/ (discussing a scholar’s daily life under Pinochet’s régime); Uki Goñi, The Long
TIMES
(Mar.
21,
2016),
Shadow
of
Argentina’s
Dictatorship,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/23/opinion/the-long-shadow-of-argentinas-dictatorship.html
(outlining the human rights abuses committed by Argentina’s military dictatorship).
23
HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 19.
24
See id. at 19–20 (discussing democratic backsliding and authoritarian régimes in Asian and
Mediterranean countries in the 1950s through the 1980s).
25
Id. at 20.
26
Id. at 20–21.
27
Id. at 21. Another report found that in 1962, thirteen governments were produced via coups
d’état, and by 1975, thirty-eight were. Id. In 1960, nine out of ten South American nations that were
former Iberian colonies had democratically elected governments. Id. But by 1973, only Venezuela and
Colombia were left. Id.
28
See id. (“This wave of transitions away from democracy was even more striking because it
involved several countries, such as Chile, Uruguay (‘the Switzerland of South America’), India, and the
Philippines, that had sustained democratic regimes for a quarter century or more.”).
29
Id. at 21–27.
30
Id. at 21.
31
Id. at 21–23.
32
Id. at 23.
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1988. Likewise, Hungary’s Central and Eastern European neighbors
began their own democratic transitions.34 The number of democratic states
rose from thirty in 1973 to fifty-eight by 1990, increasing the percentage of
democratic states from 24.6 percent to 45 percent.35 Soviet occupation was
the principal obstacle to democratization for countries east of the Iron
Curtain, and once removed, the region swiftly adopted democratic
governments.36
By 1990, many of the catalysts for the third wave of democracy had
stalled; “[n]either the White House, the Kremlin, the Vatican, nor the
European Community were in a strong position to promote democracy. . .
.”37 At the same time, at least two of the new third wave democracies had
already shifted back towards authoritarianism.38 While it is difficult to
definitively predict the duration of the third wave and what conditions may
give rise to the next reverse wave, Huntington draws three generalizations
from prior reverse waves to aid in comprehending the possible form of the
third reverse wave. First, Huntington argues that “the causes of shifts from
democratic to authoritarian political systems were at least as varied as and
in part overlap with the causes of shifts from authoritarianism to
democracy.”39 Huntington provides a useful rubric of factors that
contributed to the first and second reverse waves.40 The factors are as
follows:
(1) the weakness of democratic values among key elite
groups and the general public;
(2) economic crisis or collapse that intensified social conflict
and enhanced the popularity of remedies that could only
be imposed by authoritarian governments;
(3) social and political polarization often produced by leftist
governments attempting to introduce or appearing to
introduce too many major socioeconomic reforms too
quickly;
(4) the determination of conservative middle- and
upper-class groups to exclude populist and leftist
movements and lower-class groups from political power;
33

Id.
Id. (noting how such democratic transition included the Baltic republics and Poland).
35
Id. at 26 tbl.1.1. Note that Huntington’s figures exclude nations with populations under one
million. Id.
36
Id. at 288–89.
37
Id. at 289.
38
Id. at 290.
39
Id.
40
Id.
34
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(5) the breakdown of law and order resulting from terrorism
or insurgency;
(6) intervention or conquest by a nondemocratic foreign
government;
(7) snowballing in the form of the demonstration effects of
the collapse or overthrow of democratic systems in other
countries.41
Second, “transitions from democracy to authoritarianism were almost
always produced by those in power or close to power in the democratic
system.”42 The vast majority of these previous transitions away from
democracy occurred as either military coups d’état under which
democratically elected leaders were ousted or through “executive coups,”43
where democratically elected heads of government concentrated power in
the executive by declaring a state of emergency or instituting martial law.44
Finally, in each reverse wave, “democratic systems were replaced by
historically new forms of authoritarian rule.”45 Under the first wave,
fascism differed from prior models of authoritarianism due to “its mass
base, ideology, party organization, and efforts to penetrate and control
most of society.”46 Likewise, bureaucratic authoritarianism can be
distinguished from other forms of authoritarian military rule by its
institutional character.47 Therefore, the authoritarianism set to emerge
under the reverse wave theory should be expected to reinvent itself.
Currently, the world is in the throes of Huntington’s third reverse
wave. Democracy has statistically entered an international era of decline.48
Freedom House has documented “global declines in political rights and
civil liberties” from 2005 to 2018 in their annual Freedom in the World
41

Id. at 290–91.
Id. at 291. This claim exempts régime changes that were produced by foreign actors. Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 292.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
See, e.g., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2019: DEMOCRACY IN RETREAT 3–5
(2019),
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Feb2019_FH_FITW_2019_Report_ForWebcompressed. pdf (“Freedom in the World has recorded global declines in political rights and civil
liberties for an alarming 13 consecutive years, from 2005 to 2018. The global average score has
declined each year, and countries with net score declines have consistently outnumbered those with net
improvements.”); A Global Report on the Decline of Democracy, FOREIGN AFF. (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/press/2018-04-17/global-report-decline-democracy
(summarizing
articles published in the May/June 2018 Foreign Affairs issue on democratic decline); VARIETIES
DEMOCRACY INST., DEMOCRACY FOR ALL?: V-DEM ANNUAL DEMOCRACY REPORT 2018, at 6 (2018),
https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/vdem_democracy_report_2018.pdf (finding that autocratization has affected 2.5 billion people, or a third
of the world).
42
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rankings. The international rise of the far-right satisfies and builds upon
Huntington’s three generalizations: the factors that may lead to democratic
decline, the modes of régime transition, and the shifting image of
authoritarianism. First, many of the issues contributing to the international
rise of the far-right reflect the factors laid out by Huntington. These factors
will be employed throughout the rest of this Note to analyze the
preconditions for illiberal democracy. Huntington’s second generalization
regarding the mode of transition is the least apt to analyze the rise of the
far-right vis-à-vis illiberal democracy. Under the majority of illiberal
democracies, entire far-right political parties have seized power not
through coups d’état or executive coups, but through the democratic
process. In Hungary, this reverse wave is more party-centric than
executive-centric. And finally, illiberal democracy is the answer to
Huntington’s claim that each reverse wave brings a novel form of
authoritarianism. The following section will theorize illiberal democracy
and the conditions that fomented its development with a focus on Orbán’s
Hungary.
B. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy
The term “illiberal democracy” was originally coined by Fareed
Zakaria in 199750 and was then later appropriated by Prime Minister Viktor
Orbán as an ideological image of Fidesz’s Hungary.51 The emergence of
illiberal democracy in the twenty-first century is the modern form of
authoritarianism necessary for the third reverse wave of democracy.52
49

FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 48, at 4.
Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 22, 22 (1997).
51
Csaba Tóth, Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July
2014, BUDAPEST BEACON (July 29, 2014), https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbansspeech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/ (“Meaning, that Hungarian nation is not a simple
sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in
this sense, the new state we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny
foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, [et cetera]. But it does not make this ideology a central
element of state organization, but applies a specific, national, particular approach in its stead.”).
52
Illiberal democracy does have a nomenclatural weakness—its name does not on its face convey
the fascistic tendencies of many illiberal leaders. And, as a result, other terminologies also attempt to
conceptualize this phenomenon. For example, Gáspár Miklós Tamás developed the concept of
post-fascism to describe a “cluster” of behavior:
50

[P]olicies, practices, routines, and ideologies that can be observed everywhere in the
contemporary world; that have little or nothing to do, except in Central Europe, with
the legacy of Nazism; that are not totalitarian; that are not at all revolutionary; and
that are not based on violent mass movements and irrationalist, voluntaristic
philosophies, nor are they toying, even in jest, with anti-capitalism.
G.M. Tamás, On Post-Fascism, BOS. REV. (June 1, 2000), http://bostonreview.net/world/g-m-tamaspost-fascism. Post-fascism in ideology bears resemblance to classical fascism because of its open
hostility to universal citizenship embraced by the Enlightenment, instead believing that some classes of
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Unlike its predecessors, illiberal democracy arises more subtly than
traditional forms of authoritarian rule. As opposed to traditional
authoritarianism53—defined by closed society,54 use of force, and formal
censorship—illiberal democracies feign compliance with the general
principles of democracy. Many of the national parties promoting illiberal
democracy gain power through legitimate democratic means.55 Once
elected, “they use the levers of democratic institutions to consolidate
control, all while claiming popular support from the people to protect the
nation from foreign or domestic threats.”56 While in power, these régimes
parasitically sap the strength out of the democratic institutions through
which they were elected. This Section explores the theoretical contours of
illiberal democracy, contrasted with liberal democracy, to illustrate the
individual case of Hungary.
To properly define illiberal democracy, one must first examine the
characteristics of a liberal democracy. Zakaria’s article and subsequent
book describes a liberal democracy as “a political system marked not only
by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of
powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion,

people do not deserve citizenship to the nation and the civic rights associated with membership. Id.
This is particularly important as Enlightenment citizenship was equated with human dignity and by
recognizing universal citizenship we, in turn, recognize those citizens as human. Id. When classical
fascists and the post-fascists of today reject the citizenship of classes of people within the nation-state,
fascists also reject their humanity. Id. Under classical fascism, “civic death was necessarily followed by
natural death, that is, violent death, or death tout court.” Id. Post-fascism, however, replaces literal
death with figurative death in an anti-Enlightenment illiberal democracy. The sovereign simultaneously
grants citizenship to some residents of the nation-state while also refusing the humanity of others. Also,
unlike classical fascism, “[p]ost-fascism finds its niche easily in the new world of global capitalism
without upsetting the dominant political forms of electoral democracy and representative government.”
Id.
53
See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 408–09 (1968) (“As techniques of
government, the totalitarian devices appear simple and ingeniously effective. They assure not only an
absolute power monopoly, but unparalleled certainty that all commands will always be carried out; the
multiplicity of the transmission belts, the confusion of the hierarchy, secure the dictator’s complete
independence of all his inferiors and make possible the swift and surprising changes in policy for which
totalitarianism has become famous.”).
54
See K. R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 49 (1945) (“It is one of the
characteristic features of the magical attitude of a primitive tribal or ‘closed’ society that it lives in a
charmed circle of unchanging taboos, of laws and customs which are felt to be as inevitable as the
rising of the sun, or the cycle of the seasons, or similar obvious regularities of nature.”); cf. HENRI
BERGSON, THE TWO SOURCES OF MORALITY AND RELIGION 229 (R. Ashley Audra & Cloudesley
Brereton trans., 1935) (“The closed society is that whose members hold together, caring nothing for the
rest of humanity, on the alert for attack or defence, bound in fact, to a perpetual readiness for battle. . . .
Man was made for this society, as the ant was made for the ant-heap.”).
55
ALINA POLYAKOVA ET AL., BROOKINGS, THE ANATOMY OF ILLIBERAL STATES: ASSESSING
AND RESPONDING TO DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN TURKEY AND CENTRAL EUROPE 2 (2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/illiberal-states-web.pdf.
56
Id.
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and property.” Liberal democracies are also open societies that tend to
value civic nationalism.59 Similarly, Freedom House’s annual Freedom in
the World report splits its criteria for freedom into two separate rankings:
political rights and civil liberties.60 States with the highest political rights
rankings “enjoy a wide range of political rights, including free and fair
elections. Candidates who are elected actually rule, political parties are
competitive, the opposition plays an important role and enjoys real power,
and the interests of minority groups are well represented in politics and
government.”61 In order to attain a full forty-point ranking for political
rights, states must score positively on criteria concerning the electoral
process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of
government.62 In the realm of civil liberties, state treatment of the freedom
of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of
law, and personal autonomy and individual rights are considered criteria
for a free state.63 These two indicators, political liberties and civil liberties,
correspond to democracy and constitutional liberalism, respectively.64
Liberal democracy can be divided into two elements: democracy and
constitutional liberalism.65 While democracy primarily governs political
57

Zakaria, supra note 50, at 22.
Henri Bergson first described the concept of open society in 1935 and it was later expanded
upon by Karl Popper’s 1945 critique of totalitarianism, The Open Society and Its Enemies. As opposed
to a closed society, an open society is one in which “individuals are confronted with personal
decisions,” base their decisions on intelligence, and are critical of the taboos readily embraced in closed
societies. POPPER, supra note 54, at 152, 178. Popper argues that totalitarianism is a type of
“reactionary movements which have tried, and still try, to overthrow civilization and return to
tribalism.” Id. at 1. Under totalitarianism and closed societies, critical thinking becomes impossible
because these societies rely on “the suppression of reason and truth” and the “brutal and violent
destruction of all that is human.” Id. at 177. For Popper, this is the danger of totalitarianism: a return to
closed societies that threaten humanity. Open societies, therefore, must support freedom of thought and
expression and protect them through the rule of law.
59
Many scholars of nationalism tend to “distinguish[] ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic,’ western and eastern,
liberal and illiberal forms of nationalism.” ROGERS BRUBAKER, ETHNICITY WITHOUT GROUPS 5
(2004). Like many topics in nationalism, the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism is
difficult to define and, according to Brubaker, “normatively problematic,” but it is nonetheless worth
discussing in the context of liberal democracy. Id. Under civic nationalism, “nationhood and
nationalism have been linked to democracy, self-determination, political legitimacy, social integration,
civil religion, solidarity, dignity, identity, cultural survival, citizenship, patriotism, and liberation from
alien rule.” Id. at 132.
60
MICHAEL J. ABRAMOWITZ, FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018: DEMOCRACY IN
CRISIS 2 (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/democracy-crisis.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Zakaria, supra note 50, at 22–24.
65
Id. at 22–23; see also POLYAKOVA ET AL., supra note 55, at 2 (“Liberal principles—political
ideas that espouse the importance of individual liberties, minority rights, and the separation of power
across levers of government—and democratic institutions—processes that translate popular will into
public policy through legitimate elections . . . .”).
58
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rights, and is thus more process-oriented, constitutional liberalism’s focus
on civil rights is goal-oriented.66 Zakaria explains that the term
“constitutional liberalism” is a marriage between two interrelated concepts:
“It is liberal because it draws on the philosophical strain, beginning with
the Greeks, that emphasizes individual liberties. It is constitutional because
it rests on the tradition, beginning with the Romans, of the rule of law.”67
Constitutional liberalism developed in Western Europe and the United
States under thinkers including William Blackstone, Baron de
Montesquieu, John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and Thomas Jefferson.68 The
general concept of constitutional liberalism, despite some variance, boils
down to the argument “that human beings have certain natural (or
‘inalienable’) rights and that governments must accept a basic law, limiting
its own powers, that secures them.”69 While the existence of constitutional
liberalism in countries has led to the emergence of democracy, democracy
does not necessarily give rise to constitutional liberalism.70 Merely
arranging free elections and protecting other political rights does not
guarantee that those who democratically come to power will protect the
civil liberties enshrined by constitutional liberalism.
Although democracy and constitutional liberalism are often associated
as conjoined, the two are frequently in tension.71 In particular, democracy
and constitutional liberalism tend to conflict on the scope of government
authority: “Constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power, [and]
democracy about its accumulation and use.”72 Democracy can undermine
liberty without substantial safeguards for minority rights and liberties. John
Stuart Mill warned of “the tyranny of the majority,” under which the
democratically-elected majority could subvert the liberties protected by
constitutional liberalism.73 Illiberal democracy, then, is symptomatic of this
schism between democracy and constitutional liberalism.
66
Zakaria, supra note 50, at 25 (“Constitutional liberalism, on the other hand, is not about the
procedures for selecting government, but rather government’s goals.”).
67
Id. at 26.
68
Id. (“[Constitutional liberalism’s] canonical figures include the poet John Milton, the jurist
William Blackstone, statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, and philosophers such as
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Baron de Montesquieu, John Stewart Mill, and Isaiah
Berlin.”).
69
Id.
70
Id. at 28 (“Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy, but democracy does not seem to
bring constitutional liberalism.”).
71
Id. at 30; see also POLYAKOVA ET AL., supra note 55, at 2 (“The rise of illiberal political parties
and leaders within electoral democratic systems illustrates the schism between the foundational
principles and institutions of liberal democracies.”).
72
Zakaria, supra note 50, at 30.
73
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7 (1956) (“[I]n political speculations ‘the tyranny of the
majority’ is now generally included among the evils against which society requires to be on its
guard.”); id. at 3 (“By liberty was meant protection against the tyranny of the political rulers.”); id. at 4
(“To prevent the weaker members of the community from being preyed upon by innumerable vultures,
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Illiberal democracy, as is linguistically implied, is a form of
faux-democracy whereby some legitimate democratic processes are present
but without substantial safeguards of civil liberties as guaranteed by
constitutional liberalism. This modern form of authoritarianism enshrines
majoritarianism74 and absolute sovereignty75 as fundamental political
values, which defy liberal democratic norms. Illiberal governments
centralize authority and usurp power in a way that is “both horizontal
(from other branches of the national government) and vertical (from
regional and local authorities as well as private businesses and other
nongovernmental groups).”76 The claim that “unchecked centralization has
been the enemy of liberal democracy”77 is self-evident—Mussolini, for
example, was a democratically elected fascist who quickly centralized
power into totalitarian control.78 Likewise, “[i]lliberal democracies gain
legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably
democratic. Conversely, the greatest danger that illiberal democracy
poses—other than to its own people—is that it will discredit liberal
democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance.”79 Put
another way, illiberal democracy “is democratic because it respects the will
of the majority; illiberal because it disregards the concerns of minorities.”80
Emerging illiberal democracies can be identified by their modus operandi
that enshrines values of nationalism, majoritarianism, dictatorship of law,
absolute sovereignty, and anti-intellectualism.

it was needful that there should be an animal of prey stronger than the rest, commissioned to keep them
down. . . . The aim, therefore, of patriots, was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be
suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they meant by liberty.”).
74
ARCH PUDDINGTON, FREEDOM HOUSE, BREAKING DOWN DEMOCRACY: GOALS, STRATEGIES,
METHODS
OF
MODERN
AUTHORITARIANS
7
(2017),
AND
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/June2017_FH_Report_Breaking_Down_Democracy.pdf
(“A single idea of many authoritarians is the proposition that elections are winner-take-all affairs in
which the victor has an absolute mandate, with little or no interference, from institutional checks and
balances. . . . The Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, has instituted a thorough overhaul of the
country’s constitution and national legislation with an eye toward measures that will insulate his party
from future defeat.”).
75
Id. (“A number of governments have invoked the doctrine of absolute sovereignty to rebuff
international criticism of restrictions on the press, the smothering of civil society, the persecution of the
political opposition, and the repression of minority groups. They claim that the enforcement of
universal human rights standards or judgments from transnational legal bodies represent undue
interference in their domestic affairs and a violation of national prerogatives.”).
76
Zakaria, supra note 50, at 30.
77
Id. at 32.
78
John Foot & Christopher Hibbert, Benito Mussolini, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Benito-Mussolini (last updated Jan. 10, 2020).
79
Zakaria, supra note 50, at 42.
80
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT, FASCISM: A WARNING 172 (2018).
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C. The Illiberal Toolkit: Nationalism, Anti-Intellectualism, and Other
Illiberal Values
1. Nationalism
Modern nationalism guides much of the behavior exhibited by illiberal
democracies and deeper exploration is necessary to fully understand its
global rise. Illiberal democratic governments enshrine the needs of the
community over individual rights.81 These governments are wont to
conceive “the community” as not citizens of the polity, but instead appeal
to nationalistic conceptions of “the community” that are demarcated by
bloodline.82 Illiberal democracies differ from their liberal counterparts by
subverting civil liberties traditionally delegated to “the people” by
constitutional liberalism that is inclusive of all citizens, regardless of
ethnic, religious, political, or other identities. Instead, these leaders
narrowly tailor “the people” to mean those supportive of the illiberal
government that belong to certain ethnic groups, while otherizing the
rest.83 This anti-pluralism stokes the flames of ethnic nationalism while
bulldozing the civic nationalism traditionally associated with liberal
democracies. Ethnic nationalism, a manifestation of nationalism in which
the nation-state is defined on the basis of ethnicity,84 is a core feature of
illiberal democracies.
Nationalism as an ideology is a modern phenomenon and is deeply
prevalent throughout contemporary societies. Nationalism is “notoriously
difficult to define.”85 In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson’s
magnum opus, “the nation” is defined as “an imagined political
community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”86
This definition builds upon Ernest Gellner’s conception of nationalism as
“not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations
where they do not exist.”87 As such, the nation is a socially constructed

81
See id. (“An illiberal democracy is centered on the supposed needs of the community rather
than the inalienable rights of the individual. It is democratic because it respects the will of the majority;
illiberal because it disregards the concerns of minorities.”).
82
See id. (“[T]he togetherness [Orbán] envisions is defined by bloodlines, not borderlines.”).
83
See id. (discussing how illiberal democracies disregard the needs and rights of minorities).
84
See, e.g., BRUBAKER, supra note 59, at 132 (“[Ethnic] nationalism has been associated with
militarism, war, irrationalism, chauvinism, intolerance, homogenization, forced assimilation,
authoritarianism, parochialism, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, ethnic cleansing, even genocide; it has been
characterized as the ‘starkest political shame of the twentieth century.’”).
85
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD
OF NATIONALISM 3 (rev. ed. 2006).
86
Id. at 6.
87
ERNEST GELLNER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 168 (1964). Gellner later expanded on his theories
of nationalism in NATIONS AND NATIONALISM (1983).
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community that is imagined by those that identify as members of the
group. The nation is imagined as a limited sovereign community: limited
because its borders are finite,89 sovereign because of the influence of
Enlightenment ideals on political values,90 and a community because of the
deep comradeship prevalent amongst citizens of the nation-state.91
Modernist theorists like Anderson contend that nationalism as an ideology
was able to arise due to technological and socio-economic advances
brought about by the Industrial Revolution.92 Anderson singles out
print-capitalism as a precursor to the development of national
consciousness—a shared sense of national identity.93 Print-capitalism
unified local dialects into a language that members of a nation-state could
all understand vis-à-vis mechanical reproduction94 made possible by the
printing press and the proliferation of capitalism.95 Print-capitalism
allowed nations to consolidate numerous vernaculars into a unified
language representative of the nation, as will be seen with the
Magyarization of Hungary.96
Nation-states are socially constructed imagined communities that
purport to unify groups of peoples based on shared identity within the
confines of their finite borders. Under this framework of nationalism,
88

ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 6 (“It is imagined because the members of even the smallest
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the
minds of each lives the image of their communion.”).
89
Id. at 7 (“The nation is imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing
perhaps a billion living human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other
nations.”).
90
Id. (“It is imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which
Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical
dynastic realm.”).
91
Id. (“Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and
exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.
Ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions
of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”).
92
Id. at 46.
93
Id. at 44–45 (“These print-languages laid the bases for national consciousness in three distinct
ways. First and foremost, they created unified fields of exchange and communication below Latin and
above spoken vernaculars. . . . Second, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the
long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation. . . . Third,
print-capitalism created languages of power of a kind different from the older administrative
vernaculars. Certain dialects inevitably were ‘closer’ to each print-language and dominated their final
forms.”).
94
See also WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 217, 219–20 (Harry Zohn trans., 1969) (“Around 1900 technical reproduction had
reached a standard that not only permitted it to reproduce all transmitted works of art and thus to cause
the most profound change in their impact upon the public; it also had captured a place of its own among
the artistic processes.”).
95
See ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 37–44 (tracing the development of mass and mechanical
reproduction and its effect on the consolidation of languages).
96
See infra note 113 (discussing the history of Magyarization in nineteenth century Hungary).
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“[t]he formulation of the nation thus appears as the fulfillment of a
‘project’ stretching over centuries.”97 As illiberal democracies narrow the
perception of who belongs in their imagined community, two questions are
raised. First, “[w]hat makes the nation a ‘community’?”98 And second, who
are “the people” that are accepted into the community? The
nation-as-community conceived of by Anderson is inherently tied to the
fraternité expressed by those within the nation-state. Étienne Balibar99
writes:
Every social community reproduced by the functioning of
institutions is imaginary, that is to say, it is based on the
projection of individual existence into the weft of a collective
narrative, on the recognition of a common name and on
traditions lived as the trace of an immemorial past (even
when they have been fabricated and inculcated in the recent
past). But this comes down to accepting that, under certain
conditions, only imaginary communities are real.100
Therefore, the socially-constructed “community” is reified by the
people that further the collective narratives and mythologies of the
nation-state. Balibar argues that theoretically, this community of people
recognizes itself as an entity or group distinct from other states prior to the
foundation of the institutional state.101 But this is clearly contradictory and
impossible to actualize. Therefore, the nation cannot precede the state:

97
ÉTIENNE BALIBAR & IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS
IDENTITIES 86 (Chris Turner trans., 1991).
98
Id. at 93.
99
Étienne Balibar wrote, “Thinking about racism led us back to nationalism, and nationalism to
uncertainty about the historical realities and categorization of the nation.” Étienne Balibar, The Nation
Form: History and Ideology, 13 REV. (FERNAND BRAUDEL CTR.) 329, 329 (1990). Balibar sought to
understand how the nation-state arose and found current explanations to be unsatisfactory. The state
refers to the institutional apparatuses of a country, while the nation connotes some sort of identity.
Balibar argues that logically, states must have predated the nation-state and could not have arose
simultaneously. Therefore, he held, “it was by becoming ‘national’ that the states transformed
themselves, more or less completely, into what we call the modern state.” Id. at 330. Balibar theorized
that nation-states are created in one of three ways:

Either the states came into existence “endogenously,” seemingly autonomously, in
tandem with a process of nationalizing the state that was already located in that
territory, or they came into existence via “nationalist” (or “national liberation”)
movements, by struggling against national states that already existed or were being
created, or against “non-national” sovereign states (such as “multinational” empires,
which thereby came to seem anachronistic).
Id. at 331.
100
BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 93.
101
Id.
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In reality, the idea of nations without a state, or nations
“before” the state, is thus a contradiction in terms, because
the state always is implied in the historic framework of a
national formation . . . . But this contradiction is masked by
the fact that national states . . . project beneath their political
existence to a preexisting “ethnic” or “popular” unity.102
As such, the nation must be a product of the state, which adopts the
“nation” as its identity. By “becoming ‘national,’”103 the state transforms
itself into “the modern state”:104 the nation-state.105 In order to become
“national,” the nation-state must manufacture an identity to define the
confines of the community: “The fundamental problem is therefore to
produce the people. More exactly, it is to make the people produce itself
continually as a national community.”106
For Balibar, who was investigating the nation-state to understand “the
causes and ‘deep’ structures of contemporary racism,”107 that manufactured
identity is “fictive ethnicity.”108 An imagined community can become a
nation-state only if it is made up of persons that embrace the fraternité that
binds together the community, which does not exist naturally within any
state.109 A nation-state requires “the people” to be more than a mere
abstraction and to share a common bond that legitimizes the “national”
aspect of the nation-state.110 This is instituted through fictive ethnicity,
especially in the case of ethnic nationalism. By constructing a fictive
ethnicity that appeals to an imagined community and convinces
community members of their shared “ethnicity,” the nation-state and the
102

Balibar, supra note 99, at 331.
Id. at 330.
104
Id.
105
Balibar argues that the modern nation-state can be identified by: “its ideology and collective
sovereignty; its juridical and administrative rationality; its particular mode of regulating social
conflicts, especially class conflicts; and its ‘strategic’ objective of managing its territorial resources and
population to enhance its economic and military power.” Id. at 330–31.
106
BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 93.
107
Balibar, supra note 99, at 329.
108
BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 96.
109
See id. at 93 (“A social formation only reproduces itself as a nation to the extent that, through a
network of apparatuses and daily practices, the individual is instituted as homo nationalis from cradle
to grave, at the same times he or she is instituted as homo œconomicus, politicus, religious. . . . [S]uch a
people does not exist naturally, and even when it is tendentially constituted, it does not exist all the
time. No modern nation possesses a given ‘ethnic’ basis, even when it arises out of a national
independence struggle.”).
110
See id. (“In the case of national formations, the imaginary which inscribes itself in the real in
this way is that of the ‘people’. It is that of a community which recognizes itself in advance in the
institution of the state, which recognizes that the state as ‘its own’ in opposition to other states and, in
particular, inscribes its political struggles within the horizon of that state—by, for example, formulating
its aspirations for reform and social revolution as projects for the transformation of ‘its national
state’.”).
103
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patriotism that accompanies it is reified. In the metamorphosis of the
state into the nation-state, the population within the borders of the new
nation-state is “ethnicized” in a chrysalis that treats the group “as if they
formed a natural community, possessing of itself an identity of origins,
culture and interests which transcends individuals and social
conditions.”112 Ethnicity is produced through two modes—language113 and
race—and is established through various state institutions, including
schooling.114 Fictive ethnicity is weaponized by nationalistic illiberal
democracies and is instrumental in understanding who are “the people”
that are admitted to illiberal régimes and the compatriots that are excluded.
2. Majoritarianism, Dictatorship of Law, and Absolute Sovereignty
Despite its resemblance to democracy, illiberal democracies, informed
by ethnic nationalism, have mobilized alternative values that challenge
post-Cold War democratic norms. First, illiberal leaders tend to embrace
majoritarianism, the notion that the majority of a population should be
granted primacy when determining the outcome of a decision.115
Majoritarianism has long been rebuked by foundational democratic
111
Id. at 96 (“Fictive ethnicity is not purely and simply identical with the ideal nation which is the
object of patriotism, but it is indispensable to it, for, without it, the nation would appear precisely only
as an idea or an arbitrary abstraction; patriotism’s appeal would be addressed to no one. It is fictive
identity which makes it possible for the expression of a preexisting unity to be seen in the state, and
continually to measure the state against its ‘historic mission’ in the service of the nation, and as a
consequence, to idealize politics.”).
112
Id.
113
In Hungary, the fictive ethnicity of the Magyar is deeply rooted in language. Hungarian is an
extremely distinct language in the Finno-Ugric family whose closest relatives are Finnish and Estonian.
Hungarian has no relation to the Slavic languages spoken in the nations surrounding Hungary.
Finno-Ugric Languages, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Finno-Ugriclanguages (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). In the late nineteenth century, Hungary began the process of
Magyarization, under which non-Magyar minorities in Hungary were forced to assimilate by adopting
the Hungarian language and culture. See ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 101–07 (detailing the process of
Magyarization). Linguistic nationalism still exists in Hungary, and can be seen as a common theme in
Orbán’s speeches. See, e.g., Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Orbán Viktor’s Ceremonial Speech on the
170th Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 (Mar. 15, 2018) (“They want us to hand it over
to foreigners coming from other continents, who do not speak our language, and who do not respect our
culture, our laws or our way of life: people who want to replace what is ours with what is theirs.”);
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Address After Swearing the
Prime-Ministerial Oath of Office (May 10, 2018) (“We are a unique species. We have a language that
is unique to us. There is a world which we alone see and which we alone render through the prism of
Hungarian language and culture. Without us human civilisation would certainly be deprived of a
language, a view and a characterisation of the world. . . . I believe that Hungary, and the Hungarian
language and culture, exert an enormous magnetic power, which will attract those Hungarians whom
the wind has blown from the Carpathian Basin.”).
114
BALIBAR, supra note 97, at 96 (“History shows us that there are two great competing routes to
this: language and race.”).
115
Nicholas
Capaldi,
Majoritarianism,
ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/majoritarianism (last visited Mar. 18, 2019).
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political philosophers and is exemplified in Mill’s “tyranny of the
majority.”116 Majoritarianism is prevalent when illiberal democracies
approach elections as a “winner-take-all affair[] in which the victor has an
absolute mandate, with little or no interference from institutional checks
and balances.”117 These governments will often disregard the existence of
institutional checks on their authority—particularly with the judiciary—or
actually dismantle the democratic checks that were already in place, as
seen with Hungary.118 These actions delegitimize national legal systems
and endanger pluralism both within governance and the country. Second,
illiberal democracies will employ the “dictatorship of law,” originally
coined by Vladimir Putin119 to describe “the adoption of laws that are so
vaguely written as to give the authorities wide discretion in applying them
to regime opponents.”120 Generally, these vague laws are paired with a
weakened court system saturated with régime supporters that manipulate
the legal system to carry out the régime’s political agenda.121 Finally,
illiberal democracies frequently invoke the doctrine of absolute
sovereignty in order to insulate the state from international obligations and
“criticism of restrictions on the press, the smothering of civil society, the
persecution of political opposition, and the repression of minority
groups.”122 Sovereignty rhetoric is also deployed against international
organizations, such as the United Nations or the European Union, that
challenge state actions that run counter to international law and legal
norms.123
3. Anti-Intellectualism
The final characteristic of illiberal democracies is anti-intellectualism.
The term “anti-intellectualism” was coined in Richard Hofstadter’s
116

MILL, supra note 73, at 7.
PUDDINGTON, supra note 74, at 7.
118
See infra Part II.D (discussing the dismantling of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction by the
Fidesz party).
119
Russia’s
Dictatorship
of
Law,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
20,
2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/opinion/21sun2.html. Putin’s “dictatorship of law” is
exemplified in the case of Boris Berezovsky, a Russian oligarch who had helped finance Yeltsen’s
reelection. In 2003, Berezovsky was granted political asylum by the United Kingdom and in 2013 was
found dead in his home. His death remains an open investigation. Mary Dejevsky, The Weird World of
Boris Berezovsky: Alexander Litvinenko’s Inquest Has Provided an Intriguing Insight into the Dead
Tycoon, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-weirdworld-of-boris-berezovsky-alexander-litvinenkos-inquest-has-provided-an-intriguing-insight10117927.html.
120
PUDDINGTON, supra note 74, at 7–8.
121
Id. at 8 (“Such measures are typically paired with a court system that uses law merely to justify
political instructions from the executive branch, making a mockery of due process and international
conceptions of the rule of law.”).
122
Id. at 7.
123
Id.
117
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Anti-Intellectualism in American Life to describe the “resentment and
suspicion of the life of the mind and of those who are considered to
represent it; and a disposition constantly to minimize that value of life.”124
Anti-intellectuals that operate within populist political structures espouse
anti-elitist and anti-rationalist125 attitudes. Rational discourse is
inextricably linked to values protected by constitutional liberalism,
including those of free speech, assembly, and academic freedom.126
Although Hofstadter’s book was written in response to McCarthyism in the
United States,127 his general framework of anti-intellectual thought can be
transferred to the disdain for the intelligentsia expressed by authoritarians
around the world.
Authoritarian governments instrumentalize anti-intellectualism to
suppress political dissent by systematically removing the intelligentsia
from power and public life.128 Critical discourse and free thought, core
components of that intellectual life, can undermine authoritarian projects
by vocalizing opposition. Hannah Arendt reflects: “Intellectual, spiritual,
and artistic initiative is as dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster
initiative of the mob, and both are more dangerous than mere political
opposition.”129 Authoritarian governments “seek[] to undermine public
discourse by attacking and devaluing education, expertise, and
language.”130 By restricting access to education and spheres of critical
124

RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 27 (1963). Hofstadter
also recognizes the difficulty in defining the term: “One reason that anti-intellectualism has not even
been clearly defined is that its very vagueness makes it more serviceable in controversy as an epithet.”
Id. at 26.
125
In this context, anti-rationalism is a refusal of the “commitment to the value of critical thought
and reasoned discourse in general,” not to be confused with anti-rationalist philosophical
doctrine. Daniel Rigney, Three Kinds of Anti-Intellectualism: Rethinking Hofstadter, 61 SOC.
INQUIRY 434, 436 (1991).
126
Id. at 440 (“Rational discourse has its social bases in a constitutional system that protects free
speech and assembly, in an adversarial system of political and judicial decision-making, in the
institutions of scientific and scholarly inquiry and academic freedom, and in an emerging class of
intelligentsia for whom the ‘culture of critical discourse’ is a shared ideology.”).
127
HOFSTADTER, supra note 124, at 17–18 (“Primarily it was McCarthyism which aroused the
fear that the critical mind was at a ruinous discount in this country. Of course, intellectuals were not the
only targets of McCarthy’s constant denotations—he was after bigger game—but intellectuals were in
the line of fire, and it seemed to give special rejoicing to his followers when they were hit.”).
128
For example, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic imprisoned philosopher and dissident,
Václav Havel, numerous times between 1977 and 1989 before he became the first Czechoslovak
president following the collapse of the communist régime. Vaclav Havel: Timeline of the Former Czech
(Dec.
18,
2011,
1:46
PM),
President,
TELEGRAPH
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ czechrepublic/8964070/Vaclav-Havel-timelineof-the-former-Czech-president.html. Another example: Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist
philosopher, was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment under the Mussolini régime where he died in
a medical clinic while serving his sentence. Antonio Gramsci, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Antonio-Gramsci (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
129
ARENDT, supra note 53, at 339.
130
JASON STANLEY, HOW FASCISM WORKS: THE POLITICS OF US AND THEM 36 (2018).
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debate, the capacity for intelligent discourse is limited, allowing the
government to promote their single, “legitimate” ideology.131 The very
presence of critical academic discourse threatens the collective narratives
and mythologies constructed to support the nation-state, especially when
these narratives are recently constructed and do not conform to actual
history.
When respected, free intellectual criticism may hold more weight than
other forms of opposition, because of its ability to destabilize the flimsy
theoretical grounds that authoritarian régimes use to legitimize their rule.
Régimes, however, can also use a perversion of the university to their
advantage to prop up fascistic ideology.132 The university campus has
become a battleground site for illiberal attacks on free thought, both at
home and abroad.133 Professors, students, disciplines, and universities are
frequently targeted by illiberal régimes as dangerous voices that work to
“indoctrinate” the nation’s children.134 At the same time, régimes suppress
critical viewpoints and manipulate the education system to reify mythic
narratives of the nation-state as fact. Under these hyper-nationalist
régimes, “the function of the education system is to glorify the mythic past,
elevating the achievements of members of the nation and obscuring the
perspectives and histories of those who do not belong.”135 Disciplines such
as gender studies are frequently attacked by far-right nationalist
movements as undermining the traditions of the nation and its patriarchal
ideology136 and instead, disciplines that indoctrinate “hierarchal norms and
national tradition”137 are exalted by the régime. Higher education generally
is depicted as an elitist institution symbolic of excess.138 By rejecting and
131
See id. (“In fascist ideology, there is only one legitimate viewpoint, that of the dominant
nation.”).
132
See id. (“Education therefore either poses a grave threat to fascism or becomes a pillar of
support for the mythical nation.”).
133
See infra note 367 (describing recent attempts by governments to limit academic freedom).
134
Marxist thought tends to become the academic bogeyman for the far-right. Take, for example,
“dangerous” university, course, and professor watchlists, like those promulgated by David Horowitz.
See STANLEY, supra note 130, at 38–39 (“In 2006, Horowitz published a book, The Professors, naming
the ‘101 most dangerous professors in America,’ a list of leftist and liberal professors, many of whom
were supporters of Palestinian rights. In 2009, he published another book, One-Party Classroom, with a
list of the ‘150 most dangerous courses in America.’”).
135
Id. at 47.
136
See id. at 42–43 (analyzing motives of the far-right in attacking gender studies). Particular
anti-intellectual attacks on feminism and gender studies date back to Nazi-peddled myths that
“feminism was a Jewish conspiracy to destroy fertility among Aryan women.” Id. at 43–44.
137
Id. at 48.
138
See id. at 37, 56 (“The media largely ignored these motivations [of the Black Lives Matter
movement] and, representing protesting black students as an angry mob, used the situation as an
opportunity to foment rage against the supposed liberal political excesses of the university. . . . In
fascist politics, universities are debased in public discourse, and academics are undermined as
legitimate sources of knowledge and expertise, represented as radical ‘Marxists’ or ‘feminists’
spreading a leftist ideological agenda under the guise of research.”); see also HOFSTADTER, supra note
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mocking the value of academic expertise, the régime disrupts reality and
inserts its own one-dimensional “reality.”139 When the régime “is
successful, its audience is left with a destabilized sense of loss, and a well
of mistrust and anger against those who it has been told are responsible for
this loss.”140 By delegitimizing and forcibly targeting academics and
universities, illiberal régimes aim to stall the possibility for robust debate
and silence their critics. As such, anti-intellectualism remains in the toolkit
of modern authoritarian leaders and their illiberal democracies. This is
exemplified in the targeting of higher education institutions by modern
authoritarian leaders in Central European countries, such as Hungary and
Poland, as well as all over the world.
II. THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION
A. What is Central Europe?
This Paper investigates how illiberal democracy has developed in
Hungary. To analyze how illiberal democracy has proliferated in Hungary,
it is imperative to understand the historical conditions under which norms
of governance and national image have developed in the region. But first,
this begs the question: What is Central Europe?
Hungary is located in Central Europe—a region of small nation-states
whose very existence is constantly under threat from larger surrounding
powers.141 Since the inception of the Cold War, Europe is often viewed as
a dichotomy between Western and Eastern Europe, leaving little regard for
the nations that lie somewhere in between.142 Following the Second World
War, nations whose cultures were traditionally associated with Western
European values, such as Hungary and Czechoslovakia, found themselves
on the Eastern side of the Iron Curtain. Czech author Milan Kundera
described this experience in “The Tragedy of Central Europe.”143 As a
result of the sudden partition of some Central European nations, “three
124, at 53 (“Intellectuals, it may be held [by anti-intellectuals], are pretentious, conceited, effeminate,
and snobbish; and very likely immoral, dangerous, and subversive.”).
139
Id. at 57.
140
Id.
141
See Milan Kundera, Die Weltliteratur: How We Read One Another, NEW YORKER (Jan. 1,
2007), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/01/08/die-weltliteratur (“What distinguishes the
small nations from the large is not the quantitative criterion of the number of their inhabitants; it is
something deeper. For the small nations, existence is not a self-evident certainty but always a question,
a wager, a risk; they are on the defensive against History, that force which is bigger than they, which
does not take them into account, which does not even notice them.”).
142
Stephen Shulman, Challenging the Civic/Ethnic and West/East Dichotomies in the Study of
Nationalism, 35 COMP. POL. STUD. 554, 582–83 (2002) (“[T]he traditional civic-West/ethnic-East
argument is a gross simplification of concepts of nationhood in the West, Central Europe, and Eastern
Europe.”).
143
Milan Kundera, The Tragedy of Central Europe, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Apr. 26, 1984, at 33.
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fundamental situations developed in Europe after [the Second World War]:
that of Western Europe, that of Eastern Europe, and, most complicated,
that of the part of Europe situated geographically in the center—culturally
in the West and politically in the East.”144 Kundera characterized Central
Europe as being “[b]oxed in by the Germans on one side and the Russians
on the other”145 and as “the least known and the most fragile part of the
West,”146 despite Central Europe’s wide contributions to the “European
canon” from intellectuals such as Sigmund Freud, Béla Bartok, and Franz
Kafka. Following the First World War, Central Europe was “transformed
into a region of small, weak states, whose vulnerability ensured first
Hitler’s conquest and ultimately Stalin’s triumph.”147 Kundera argues that
Central Europe is defined not by political power, but by its culture: “the
great common situations that reassemble peoples, regroup them in ever
new ways along the imaginary and ever-changing boundaries that mark a
realm inhabited by the same memories, the same problems and conflicts,
the same common tradition.”148 Despite the vast cultural contributions
made to “Western European culture” by Central Europe, as soon as the
Iron Curtain closed around Central Europe, Western Europe was incapable
of understanding the region as anything more than its politics, which was
decidedly Eastern European.149 But, Soviet usurpation was far more than a
political struggle—it was also an attack on Central European civilization
itself. The revolts in response to these existential attacks on Central
European civilization were led by the intelligentsia150 as a “struggle to
preserve [Central European] identity—or, to put it another way, to preserve
their Westernness.”151 But, because the region became regarded as an
Eastern political régime, “Europe [had not] noticed the disappearance of its
cultural home because Europe no longer perceive[d] its unity as a cultural
unity.”152 This struggle for identity was completely ignored by Western
Europe and, yet again, Central Europe was forgotten by its cultural
brethren.153 Kundera’s tragedy—that Central European nations had all but

144

Id.
Id. at 34.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 35.
149
Id. at 37.
150
Id. These revolts “were prepared, shaped, realized by novels, poetry, theater, cinema,
historiography, literary reviews, popular comedy and cabaret, philosophical discussions—that is, by
culture.” Id.
151
Id. at 34.
152
Id. at 36.
153
Id.
145
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vanished from the map of Western Europe—rests not on the Soviet Union,
but on Western European nations for abandoning them.154
Kundera ultimately defines Central Europe as “[a]n uncertain zone of
small nations between Russia and Germany.”155 Unlike their neighbors,
“the small nation is one whose very existence may be put in question at
any moment; a small nation can disappear and it knows it.”156 At the time
of writing, all of Central Europe, except Austria, had been swallowed up
by the Soviet Union.157 Kundera argues that once the majority of Central
Europe was subjugated by the Soviet Union, the region was forgotten by
Western Europe.158 Leading up to the true independence of Central
European states, the region faced immense political strife: Nazi invasion, a
long stretch of failed revolutions, and finally, Soviet domination. Even
prior to the Second World War, Hungary’s struggles were often
overlooked by the larger European community. Unlike larger Western
nations, such as the United Kingdom, France, or Germany, the histories of
these small Central European nations have been “turbulent and
fragmented.”159 Their histories, including Hungary’s, have been ones of
frequent invasion and in turn, “[t]heir traditions of statehood have been
weaker and less continuous than those of the larger European nations.”160
Hungary’s history includes long occupations by the Mongols, the Ottoman
Empire, the Hapsburg Empire, the Third Reich, and the Soviet Union.161
Unlike their western neighbors, Central European nation-states experience
constant existential threat. István Bibó aptly reflects:
“The death of the nation” or “the annihilation of the nation”
rings empty in West European ears; Westerners can imagine
extermination, subjection, or slowly going native, but
political “annihilation” overnight is sheer bombast to them,
yet it is a palpable reality for the nations of Eastern Europe.
Here there is no need to exterminate or expel a nation to

154
Id. at 38 (“The real tragedy for Central Europe, then, is not Russia but Europe: this Europe that
represented a value so great that the director of the Hungarian News Agency was ready to die for it, and
for which he did indeed die. . . . He did not suspect that the sentence he was sending by telex beyond
the borders of his flat country would seem outmoded and would not be understood.”).
155
Id. at 35.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 36.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 34.
160
Id.
161
Hungary Timeline, BBC NEWS (Feb. 14, 2012), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/
country_profiles/1054642.stm.
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make it feel endangered; it is enough to call its existence into
doubt with a sufficiently aggressive rhetoric.162
This persistent existential threat to independent nationhood has
impacted the democratic development of Central Europe and “has been the
decisive factor in making democracy and democratic development waver
in these countries.”163 The embedded identity of the existential anxiety of
the nation-state guides political and legal decision-making and may even
interfere with Hungary’s democratic prospects.
B. Hungarian Political History (Hapsburg—1989)
Developments in Hungarian history uniquely positioned the nation to
be susceptible to the rise of the far-right. Wilkin contends that “the roots of
illiberalism in the modern world-system are a reaction, in part, to the threat
that liberalism presented to established social hierarchies, secular or
religious”164 in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Elements of
illiberalism have been persistent throughout Hungarian political history.
Wilkin argues that four major periods of history shaped the development of
the Hungarian nation-state and its relationship to illiberalism. First, the
restoration of the monarchy and the establishment of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, following the defeat of the democratic Hungarian Revolution of
1848, was reactionary and anti-modern.165 Monarchical systems are,
unsurprisingly, adverse to the classical liberal values that threaten the
social hierarchies entrenched in traditional monarchies.166 Second, the
crumbling of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War bred
animosity within the nation-state after “it suffered drastic loss of territory
and population through the Treaty of Trianon.”167 Hungary’s experience
during the inter-war period mirrors that of other Central Powers, like
Germany, whose reactionary fascist forces rose to power as a response to
the aftermath of the war.168 This massive loss of territory “left a lasting
162

ISTVÁN BIBÓ, The Miseries of East European Small States, in THE ART OF PEACEMAKING 130,
150 (Iván Zoltán Dénes ed., Péter Pásztor trans., 2015).
163
Id. at 151.
164
Peter Wilkin, The Rise of ‘Illiberal’ Democracy: The Orbánization of Hungarian Political
Culture, 24 J. WORLD-SYS. RES. 5, 9 (2018).
165
Id. at 13.
166
Id. at 13–14 (“[The Hungarian monarchy was] understandably[] deeply hostile to liberal ideas
of universality and equality, preferring instead to entrench social life in traditional social hierarchies
shaped through the church and respect for secular authority in the forms of the King and the
aristocracy.”).
167
Id. at 14.
168
ARENDT, supra note 53, at 308 (“After the first World War, a deeply anti-democratic,
prodictatorial wave of semitotalitarian and totalitarian movements swept Europe; Fascist movements
spread from Italy to nearly all Central and Eastern European countries . . . .”). Also note,
Austro-Hungary lost two-thirds of its territory and two-thirds of its population. Treaty of Trianon,
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legacy of resentment amongst the country’s right-wing social forces, which
still manifests itself rhetorically today with both Fidesz and Jobbik.”169
Third, Hungary’s experience with fascism and Nazism during the Second
World War impacted the rise of illiberal democracy in the country today by
bringing anti-Semitism, racism, and other prejudices to the fore.170 The
Second World War presented an opportunity for Hungary to reclaim its
lost territory; but, by 1944, Hungary had become a puppet state for Nazi
Germany after a coup d’état by the far-right fascist Arrow Cross Party.171
Finally, after the defeat of the Axis forces in the Second World War, the
Soviet Union army invaded Hungary and instituted another authoritarian
régime. Between 1945 and 1989, Hungary was occupied by Soviet forces
that quashed democratic revolutions172 and decimated civil society.173
These eras of Hungarian history shaped its development as a nation-state in
the longue durée and influenced the rise of Orbán’s illiberal democratic
project.
C. Fledgling Democracy: The Interim Years (1989–2010)
Prime Minister Orbán’s rise to power directly resulted from the
missteps of the governments in power during the democratic transitionary
period.174 Just as democracy emerged, neo-fascist and anti-Semitic
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-of-Trianon (accessed Mar. 19,
2019).
169
Wilkin, supra note 164, at 14.
170
Id. at 15 (noting the role that Hungarians and the Hungarian government played in the Final
Solution).
171
JACK R. FISCHEL, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE HOLOCAUST 122–23 (1999). Ferenc
Szálasi, the Prime Minister of Hungary and leader of the Arrow Cross Party, was found guilty for war
crimes and was sentenced to death. Militiamen of the Arrow Cross Party conducted a reign of terror
that resulted in the violent murder of many Hungarian Jews. Hungary After the German Occupation,
U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/hungaryafter-the-german-occupation (accessed Mar. 18, 2019). By the end of the Second World War, an
estimated 563,000 Hungarian Jews died at the hands of the Arrow Cross Party and the Nazi régime. Id.
Wilkin notes that Szálasi’s “enthusiasm for the Final Solution was implacable. . . . [A]t times SS
officers in Hungary had to restrain the Hungarian forces from their enthusiastic slaughter of the Jewish
population.” Wilkin, supra note 164, at 15.
172
See Ben Cosgrove, A Rip in the Iron Curtain: Photos From the Hungarian Revolution, 1956,
TIME (Oct. 22, 2013), http://time.com/3878232/the-hungarian-revolution-of-1956-photos-from-thestreets-of-budapest/ (collecting photographs from the 1956 Hungarian Revolution).
173
See Péter Krasztev, Social Responses to the “Hybridization” of the Political System: The Case
of Hungary in the Central and Eastern European Context, in THE HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL
OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 167, 171 (Péter Krasztev et al. eds., 2015) (“The historian
Stephen Kotkin has called state socialist societies ‘uncivic societies,’ and the Hungarian example
certainly proves this: the Kádár regime was efficient enough to make opposition seem futile and thus
eliminate social solidarity and autonomy, and these attitudes still live on today.”).
174
András Bozóki, Broken Democracy, Predatory State, and Nationalist Populism, in THE
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 3, 4 (Péter Krasztev et al.
eds., 2015) (“This antiliberal turn did not emerge out of the blue: it was a direct response to the hectic
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movements, fueled by nationalism, simultaneously rose to mainstream
discourse.175 This Section will explore how internal failures in Hungarian
government and external factors influenced the rise of illiberal democracy
under Orbán by using Huntington’s factors176 that contributed to prior
reverse waves of democracy. The most relevant factors for this period of
time are: (1) the weakness of democratic values; (2) severe economic
setbacks; (3) social and political polarization; (4) the exclusion of
non-elites by elites; and (5) the breakdown of law and order.177
The weakness of democratic values and increasing political
polarization in the transitional period were instrumental in prompting the
rise of the far-right. The post-Cold War Hungarian democratic process was
deeply flawed. Bozóki identifies three institutional factors that contributed
to Orbán’s success: the qualified majority vote, informal rulemaking, and
partocracy. 178 The Hungarian Founding Fathers placed an emphasis on
“strengthen[ing] the new democratic order, its stability, and its
governability”179 when drafting the new democratic institutional system.
The Founding Fathers attempted to achieve these goals by instituting
required qualified majority votes in many arenas of the decision-making
process.180 Bozóki writes:
These measures created a democracy in which, between
elections, the ruling government’s power became almost
cemented. It became nearly impossible to remove an
incumbent government from the outside; however, this
simultaneously made effective governance more difficult.
The government in power, due to the large number of
qualified majority rules, had to rely on the opposition to
make decisions on basic issues. Paradoxically, the
constitution thus both greatly increased the power and
limited the political responsibility of the government.181
By overvaluing stability, the constitutional system that existed between
1990 and 2010 created systematic inefficiencies that, in turn, contributed to
the devaluing of democracy. Bozóki also remarks that Hungary’s history of
occupation “produced a political culture characterized by a prevalence of
reforms implemented by previous governments between 2006 and 2010, as well as the ensuing
corruption and economic crisis.”).
175
Wilkin, supra note 164, at 18.
176
HUNTINGTON, supra note 5, at 290–91.
177
Id.
178
Bozóki, supra note 174, at 5–9.
179
Id. at 5.
180
Id. (“[T]he Founding Fathers believed that they could safeguard freedom by increasing the
number of decisions that required a qualified majority vote.”).
181
Id.
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informal practices and a lack of institutional accountability.” In order to
cope with occupation, a dual system of contradictory formal and informal
rules developed whereby the official rules of the occupier would be
followed while finding loopholes and cutting corners so as to undermine
official rule.183 This dual rule system persisted throughout the Kádár era of
communism and, Bozóki argues, made the system more bearable than
those of its neighbors.184 Because of Hungary’s long history of occupation,
Bozóki contends that “in 1989 Hungarians broke only with the institutional
system of dictatorship, not with the customs and informal procedures
associated with that system.”185 While this dual rule system was vital
during occupation, the persistent culture of rule-bending delegitimized
democratic rule in post-occupation life. Finally, “partocracy,” the form of
government by which a single party rules hegemonically,186 is culturally
endemic in Hungarian politics and at odds with democratic norms.187 The
anti-pluralism that current day Hungary is experiencing is not novel to
Orbán’s régime and in fact predates it. Political parties, including those on
the left, dominate all aspects of the political process: public discourse,
civic duties, and candidate nominations were all controlled by the major
political parties.188 Thus, the Hungarian democratic system, in its most free
state, was highly politicized and plagued by the excessive control of areas
of public life that should have remained free from government interference

182

Id. at 6.
Id. (“Hungarians learned that they only had to feign obedience to the rules imposed upon them
by foreign invaders: below the surface, they established a system of informal rules governing society
and culture. . . . Therefore, Hungarians learned to get their way around these rules in a conniving
fashion, finding loopholes and cutting corners, and this behavioral pattern remains deeply engrained in
Hungarian society.”).
184
Id. (“The reason [the regime] became more livable is that the system often did not take its own
rules seriously. . . . Under Kádárism, citizens grew accustomed to those procedures that made the
dictatorship bearable. For Hungarians, the old system was not nearly as bad as it had been for the Poles,
the Czechs, or the Romanians.”).
185
Id.
186
Wilkin, supra note 164, at 18–19 (“Hungary’s political system [was] dominated by either
neoliberal parties such as the reform communists and liberal parties (MSZP and SZDSZ) who governed
between 1994–[19]98 and 2002–2010; or conservative-nationalist coalitions led initially by the MDF
who governed from 1990–[19]94, with Fidesz in office between 1998–2002, leading a coalition
including the Christian Democrats and the Smallholders Party.”).
187
See Bozóki, supra note 174, at 7 (“During the second decade of democracy in Hungary, party
politics superseded almost all other aspects.”).
188
See id. at 7–8 (“Public discourse was based on party allegiance. . . . It was the parties that
organized movements; it was the parties that established public benefit foundations, professional
groups, and civic circles. . . . The particular features of the Hungarian political system—including the
collection of candidate nomination slips, the high threshold to enter parliament, the large number of
regulatory areas in which a qualified majority is required in order to create new laws, the opacity of
political party financing, the privileged position of political party foundations, and so on—facilitated
the survival of existing parties and made it difficult for new political forces to enter parliament.”).
183
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but were instead controlled by the dominant political party. Partocracy
only served to further polarize the Hungarian public in an already turbulent
time, creating an atmosphere of a “cold civil war” between those on the left
and right.190 Unchanged, all three practices made the chances of a lasting,
stable democracy dead on arrival.
Throughout the late 1990s and persisting to the current day, Hungary
has faced many economic crises. As the formerly communist nation
transitioned to democracy, Hungary also transitioned to capitalism.
Hungary slowly privatized and the transition resulted in an unstable
economy.191 Hungary experienced rapid deindustrialization, widening
regional inequalities.192 As a result of this rough transition, Hungary
became increasingly reliant on external financial investments, primarily
from the European Union and Japan.193 In Hungary’s first decade of
democracy, the country “experienced periods of massive contraction,”194
but began to steady itself in the new millennium.195 This quasi-stability was
quickly quashed by the unpopular austerity measures pushed through by
the MSZP-SZDSZ government196 in 2006 and the global recession in
2008.197 Tóth and Grajczjár speculate that “the recovery period was too
short to solve the internal societal tensions, poverty and underemployment,
to bridge the wide gap between the eastern and western parts of the
country, and to stop the deterioration of public institutions.”198 These
austerity measures promoted by elite members of the MSZP-SZDSZ
coalition ran contrary to what the majority of Hungarians actually
desired.199 The political scene only became more polarized when a
confidential speech by then-Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in

189

Id. at 8–9 (“The Hungarian system was characterized by a highly politicized society and by the
excessive sway that political parties held in various areas of public life.”).
190
Id. at 8 (describing the depths of political polarization in Hungary as a result of partocracy).
191
Wilkin, supra note 164, at 20.
192
Id. at 18.
193
Id. at 20.
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
The MSZP-SZDSZ was a coalition government between the Hungarian Socialist Party
(Magyar Szocialista Párt) and the Alliance of Free Democrats’ (Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége – a
Magyar Liberális Párt) party which held a close majority before Fidesz won a majority. Csaba
Nikolenyi, Strategic Co-Ordination in the 2002 Hungarian Election, 56 EUR.-ASIA STUD. 1041, 1041
(2004).
197
Bozóki, supra note 174, at 11.
198
András Tóth & István Grajczjár, The Rise of the Radical Right in Hungary, in THE
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 133, 158 (Péter Krasztev &
Jon Van Til eds., 2015).
199
Wilkin, supra note 164, at 19 (“The problem was that these austerity policies were against
what the majority of the Hungarian population actually wanted at the time.”).
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Balatonőnszöd was leaked. In the speech, Gyurcsány said that he and the
MSZP-SZDSZ government “had knowingly lied to the public concerning
the economic situation in Hungary,”201 causing an eruption of “violent
street protests”202 on the anniversary of the 1956 Revolution.203 This
economic crisis was intensified by the global recession and occurred
“when the government was rapidly losing its political credibility
domestically.”204 The mishandling of the economic crisis decimated
support for MSZP and opened the door for far-right parties to rise to
prominence.205 In addition to Fidesz, the Jobbik party, a radical far-right
party that has been described as neo-fascist,206 emerged during the
economic crises.207 By the 2010 parliamentary elections, support for MSZP
dropped to 20 percent208 while Jobbik captured 16.67 percent of the vote,
becoming the third largest party in parliament.209
Finally, during the interim period of democratization, far-right parties
peddled “law and order” narratives that targeted the Roma.210 Tóth and
Grajczjár argue that anti-Roma “law and order” rhetoric entered public
discourse in 2006 after a tragic murder was committed by a group of Roma
in Olaszliszka.211 This event was the catalyst for an outpouring of
anti-Roma sentiments, with Jobbik leading this discourse as “protector of

200
Philipp Karl, Network Analysis of Right-Wing Extremism in Hungary, in MINORITIES UNDER
ATTACK: OTHERING AND RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN SOCIETIES 221, 222
(Sebastian Goll et al. eds., 2016).
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Tóth & Grajczjár, supra note 198, at 137.
204
Bozóki, supra note 174, at 11.
205
Id. at 3, 4.
206
Jobbik, COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/
files/threat_pdf/Jobbik-12172018.pdf (last visited Mar. 23, 2019).
207
PETER KREKÓ ET AL., BROOKINGS, ANTI-MUSLIM POPULISM IN HUNGARY: FROM THE
MARGINS TO THE MAINSTREAM (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/anti-muslim-populism-inhungary-from-the-margins-to-the-mainstream/.
208
Tóth & Grajczjár, supra note 198, at 137.
209
Id. at 139.
210
The Roma are a richly diverse, historically nomadic group of people who likely originated in
northern India and migrated towards Europe in approximately the tenth or eleventh centuries.
Throughout their history, the Roma have been subjected to abuse, enslavement, and extermination. In
Romania, the Roma were enslaved between the fourteenth century until the 1850s. In Nazi Germany,
between 250,000 and 500,000 Roma perished in the Holocaust. An additional note: while the Roma are
also referred to as “Gypsies,” this is a widely recognized slur and will be omitted from quoted
materials, except for in the case of direct quotes from far-right speeches. Samira Shackle, Roma
Holocaust: Amid Rising Hate, ‘Forgotten’ Victims Remembered, A LJAZEERA (Oct. 30, 2019),
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/roma-holocaust-rising-hate-forgotten-victimsremembered-191029173851099.html; see Adrian Marsh, Gypsies, Roma, Travellers: An Animated
History, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND. (June 5, 2013), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/gypsiesroma-travellers-animated-history (detailing the history of the Roma people).
211
Tóth & Grajczjár, supra note 198, at 138.
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‘the honest, hardworking common people’” against “Gypsy crime.”213
The Jobbik propagation of this racist discourse was ultimately successful in
widening their voter base and bringing far-right politics to the fore:
“[M]any [Hungarians] felt themselves being finally liberated from the
left-liberal stranglehold of political correctness and allowed themselves to
give vent to long-suppressed resentment, naming the causes of their real or
imagined grievances.”214 In 2007, Jobbik spurred the creation of the
Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda),215 a paramilitary group dedicated to the
“defence” of Hungary against “Gypsy criminality.”216 Other anti-Roma
extremist groups, such as Véderő and Szebb Jövőért, scheduled marches so
hostile and aggressive that they caused Roma populations to evacuate
towns, such as Gyöngyöspata, in fear for their safety.217 This xenophobic
mainstream law and order rhetoric is echoed in the contemporary far-right
discourse surrounding the refugee crisis.218
D. Rise of Hungarian Illiberal Democracy (2010–present)
The tumultuous period of democratic transition preceding Fidesz’s
régime greatly contributed to the party’s triumph.219 The nascent illiberal
democracy became cemented as Hungary’s new system of governance
through sweeping unilateral legal reforms. These reforms enshrined the
illiberal principles of majoritarianism, absolute sovereignty, dictatorship of
law, nationalism, and anti-intellectualism.220 The following section will
examine how Orbán instrumentalized the law to claim the government for
his own party and apply it to the typical characteristics of an illiberal
democracy. The cumulative effect of these reforms is demonstrated in
Freedom House’s decision to downgrade Hungary’s freedom ranking from
“free” to “partially free” in 2019.221 These legal reforms attacked six arenas
212
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Id.
214
Id.
215
The Magyar Gárda was disbanded by Metropolitan Court of Budapest in 2009. After
unsuccessful appeals in the national judicial system, the Magyar Gárda brought their case to the
European Court of Human Rights and alleged that the national decision violated freedom of assembly
as guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights. The court held that Article 11 was not
violated and upheld the judgments of the Hungarian national courts. Vona v. Hungary, App. No.
35943/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013) paras. 16–18, 72.
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Id. para. 10.
217
Karl, supra note 200, at 223.
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See infra Part II.D.
219
See supra Part II.C.
220
Id.
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FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2019: HUNGARY (2019),
https://freedomhouse.org/ country/hungary/freedom-world/2019 (“Hungary’s status declined from Free
to Partially Free due to sustained attacks on the country’s democratic institutions by Prime Minister
Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, which has used its parliamentary supermajority to impose restrictions on
or assert control over the opposition, the media, religious groups, academia, NGOs, the courts, asylum
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of democracy: the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, the presidency,
independent institutions, the media, and civil society.
Before Orbán’s Fidesz came into power, Hungary “was a liberal
democracy characterized by a multiparty system, free elections,
representational government, a strong opposition, free media, strong, and
credible institutions that protected the rule of law (i.e., the Constitutional
Court and Ombudsman’s Office), and independent courts.”222 In stark
contrast, the Orbán government approaches law not as an entity to be
respected, but as a body to be manipulated in order to fit the needs of
Fidesz’s political agenda.223 This is first and foremost exemplified with
Fidesz’s unilateral rewriting of the Constitution. The framers of the old
Constitution, drafted after the fall of communism, had two concerns when
structuring the new government: first, “a fractured parliament in which
small parties would be unable to form stable majority coalitions” and
second, “a deeply entrenched constitution that would be too hard to change
once the new democrats figured out how they wanted to design their
political institutions.”224 The resulting constitution was one that favored
larger parties with a provision allowing parliament to alter any part of the
Constitution so long as they secure a two-thirds majority.225 This fatal flaw
in the Constitution revealed itself after Fidesz secured 53 percent of the
popular vote, translating into 68 percent of the seats in parliament.226 This
meant that Fidesz was now capable of unilaterally amending the
Constitution. In their first year in power, Fidesz amended the Constitution
twelve times, altering more than fifty separate provisions and weakening
any and all checks and balances.227 Fidesz used their two-thirds majority
power to erase the last measure restraining constitutional amendments: the
requirement of “a four-fifths vote of parliament to set the rules for writing
a new constitution.”228 The elimination of this rule allowed Fidesz to draft
a completely new constitution while barring any opposing voices from
sitting at the table.
seekers, and the private sector since 2010.”). Cf. FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2018:
HUNGARY (2018), https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/freedom-world/2018 (displaying a 72/100
Global Freedom Score and designating Hungary as “free”).
222
András Bozóki, Occupy the State: The Orbán Regime in Hungary, 19 DEBATTE: J. CONTEMP.
CENT. & E. EUR. 649, 649 (2011).
223
See id. at 651 (“[T]he new government saw the 1989 Constitution as a heap of purely technical
rules, which Orbán has since shaped to fit the needs of his current political agenda. If any of his new
laws proved to be unconstitutional, it was not the law, but the Constitution that had to be changed.”).
224
Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling
the Constitution, in THE HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 37,
37 (Péter Krasztev & Jon Van Til eds., 2015).
225
Id. at 37–38.
226
Id. at 38.
227
Id.
228
Id.
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Now in control of the executive and legislative branches, Fidesz’s next
target was the Constitutional Court. Before Fidesz’s reign, the
Constitutional Court was a powerful check on the government.229 First,
Fidesz utilized its newfound amendment powers to change the judicial
nomination process by allowing the party in power to nominate candidates
to be elected to the court by a two-thirds majority, completely eliminating
pluralism from the process.230 The Constitution had previously “required a
majority of parliamentary parties to agree to a nomination and then a
two-thirds vote of parliament’s members to elect the nominee to the
court.”231 Second, Fidesz attacked the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction
after it declared a retroactive tax law that punished members of the former
MSZP-SZDSZ government unconstitutional232 and retaliated by “amending
the Constitution and limiting the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.”233
Parliament barred the Constitutional Court from reviewing any law about
fiscal matters unless it affects “rights to life, dignity, data privacy, thought,
conscience, religion, and citizenship.”234 Finally, the Fidesz government
packed the Constitutional Court and delegated themselves the power to
name seven of the fifteen judges as well as the chairperson of the
Constitutional Court.235 As to be expected, all of the nominees are
Fidesz-affiliates.236
In addition to the Constitutional Court, Fidesz uprooted the
appointment procedure for judgeships in every single court in the country.
Before Fidesz, lower court judges were independently appointed by a panel
of their fellow judges.237 Under the new system, Fidesz established the
National Judicial Office (KIH) to oversee the judiciary and holds “the
power to select new judges, to promote or demote any judge, to begin
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Id.
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id. (“In order to plug gaping budget holes, the Fidesz government established a 98 percent
retroactive tax on the customary departing bonuses of those who had left public employment in the
preceding five years. The Constitutional Court, before it could be packed with a working majority of
new judges, struck down this tax as unconstitutional.” (footnote omitted)).
233
Bozóki, Occupy the State, supra note 222, at 651.
234
Bánkuti et al., supra note 224, at 39. Bánkuti et al. note that the Constitutional Court is
explicitly barred from reviewing “budget or tax laws if they infringe other rights that are much easier to
limit with fiscal measures, such as the right to property, equality under the law, the prohibition against
retroactive legislation, and the guarantee of fair judicial procedure.” Id. Fidesz also sought to
nationalize private pensions, directly resulting in the European Court of Human Rights being flooded
with 8000 cases on the matter due to the Constitutional Court’s inability to act. Id.
235
See Bozóki, Occupy the State, supra note 222, at 651–52 (“In addition, the number of judges
was increased from eleven to fifteen, and the Court was packed with right-wing personalities and
former politicians known to be close to Fidesz.”).
236
Id.
237
Bánkuti et al., supra note 224, at 42.
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disciplinary proceedings, and to select the leaders of each of the courts.”238
The president of the KIH has a nine year term and is selected by a
two-thirds majority vote in parliament, again guaranteeing that the head of
this “independent” body would be a friend of Fidesz.239 In this case, current
Chairperson Tünde Handó is quite literally “a close friend of Prime
Minister Orbán and the wife of József Szájer,” the Vice President of Fidesz
and principal architect of the new constitution.240 In contrast to other legal
systems, Chairperson Handó also has the sole authority to reassign cases
throughout the country at will.241 As such, the legitimacy of the entire
Hungarian judicial system has been decimated in under a decade.
The checks delegated to the president’s office and purportedly
independent accountability institutions have also been delegitimized. First,
under the old constitution, the president’s main check was that of the
suspensive veto power.242 In the case of the president’s office, parliament
simply elects hardline Fidesz supporters, like Pál Schmitt and János Áder,
who refuse to veto Fidesz legislation.243 Second, Hungary’s old
ombudsman system comprised of “four separate ombudsmen with separate
staffs and independent jurisdictions”244 that monitored human rights issues.
Now, there is a single parliamentary commissioner for fundamental rights
that operates with a severely reduced staff.245 The Data Protection
Supervisor was abolished and a new, non-independent office was
established.246 In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union found
that in doing so, Hungary failed to fulfill its obligations under the 1995
Data Protection Directive.247 Third, the State Audit Office, once an
independent body with the power to investigate the misuse of public funds,
is now led by a former Fidesz MP with no professional auditing
experience. 248 Fourth, the National Election Commission (NVB), the
238
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Id. at 43.
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Id. at 44.
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C-288/12,
Comm’n
v.
Hung.,
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E.C.R.
I-nyr,
https://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2012:227:0015:0016:EN:PDF.
247
Bánkuti et al., supra note 224, at 44.
248
Id. at 39. Independent Hungarian media allege that the State Audit Office is selectively
enforcing auditing regulation aimed at harming opposition parties, while dismissing like investigations
on Fidesz. Jobbik is facing fines of 662 million forints ($2.4 million) for illegal in-kind campaign
contributions, while three parties are facing fines for “renting office space below market rates”: The
Democratic Coalition, 16 million forints ($58,000); Együtt, 16 million forints ($58,000); and Politics
Can Be Different 8.8 million forints ($31,900). Christopher Adam, The Hungarian State Audit Office’s
Assault on Democracy, HUNGARIAN FREE PRESS (Jan. 9, 2018, 3:35 PM),
http://hungarianfreepress.com/ 2018/01/09/the-hungarian-state-audit-offices-assault-on-democracy/.
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independent body charged with regulating election law, has been filled
with a Fidesz majority.249 In addition to monitoring elections and drawing
electoral maps,250 the NVB also has the power to decide what referenda
will be voted on in elections.251 This is particularly notable as referenda are
one of the most substantial areas that civil society can attempt to influence
the Fidesz government.252 Finally, the new constitution created the Budget
Council that may “veto any budget produced by parliament that adds even
a single forint [(0.004¢)] to the national debt.”253 The terms for Budget
Council officials exceed that of a standard parliamentary election cycle,
therefore allowing the Budget Council to “exercise dead-hand control over
future elected governments.”254 Even worse, “if parliament fails to agree on
a budget by March 31 of each year, then the president may dissolve
parliament and call new elections.”255 If the Budget Council utilizes its
veto power right before the deadline, it could force a new election.256 Thus,
Fidesz’s partocracy extends beyond the three branches of government and
invades purportedly independent institutions as well.
Fidesz has usurped power horizontally by controlling the vast majority
of mainstream media. The Fidesz government established the National
Media and Infocommunications Authority (NMHH), a regulatory agency
and an “independent” Media Council, charged with monitoring media
outlets and fining outlets that do not have “balanced” news
programming.257 Like other “independent” government agencies, Orbán
appointed a former Fidesz MP to lead the NMHH, and parliament elected
Fidesz loyalists fill all the seats on the Media Council.258 Although the
Hungarian Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the
press,259 the public television broadcaster is biased in favor of Fidesz and
249

Bánkuti et al., supra note 224, at 39.
Fidesz’s ability to modify election law without cooperation from outside parties has allowed
them to manipulate previously independent institutions to preserve their two-thirds majority. For
example, in 2014, Fidesz won only 44 percent of the popular vote, but still maintained their two-thirds
majority in parliament. Martino Comelli & Vera Hovárth, What Orbán Knows and His Enemies Don’t,
JACOBIN MAG. (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2018/03/viktor-orban-hungary-fideszauthoritarian-opposition.
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MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY
art. IX [hereinafter HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTION] (“(1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression. (2) Hungary shall recognize and protect the freedom and diversity of the press, and shall
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actively undermines the opposition; Fidesz selectively awards advertising
contracts and radio station frequencies to supporters and pressures critical
news outlets into silence or closes them.260 Népszabadság, the largest
opposition newspaper, was unexpectedly suspended from operation after it
uncovered Fidesz scandals and its parent company was subsequently sold
to Optimus Press, a firm owned by Fidesz allies.261 The firm has no plans
to reopen Népszabadság.262 Fidesz affiliates and pro-government media
currently dominate the market,263 and much of the opposition media has
been pushed to the internet.264 Approximately 90 percent of all media in
Hungary is owned by either the government or allies of Fidesz and use
their publications to push pro-government views.265 For example, a study
by Democracy Reporting International and Mérték Media Monitor studied
broadcasts by television stations about the refugee resettlement program
referendum in Hungary, supported by the European Union, and found that
91 percent of programming by public television stations took antireferendum positions.266 Currently, Freedom House has ranked Hungary’s
freedom of the press as only “partly free.”267
supervising media services, press products and the communications market shall be laid down in a
cardinal Act.”).
260
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2017: HUNGARY (2017),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/59fc67e6a.html. Additionally, the “donation” of most major media
outlets—over four hundred—to a pro-Fidesz foundation run by Orbán’s childhood friend is yet another
example that Orbán’s “economic patriotism” is merely a guise for his crony capitalism. Of course, this
mass donation to the Central European Press and Media Foundation must be approved by regulatory
authorities (led by Orbán appointees). If approved, “the deal will place most leading private Hungarian
outlets under the control of a single, state-friendly entity.” Patrick Kingsley, Orban and His Allies
Cement Control of Hungary’s News Media, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/world/europe/hungary-orban-media.html.
261
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2017, supra note 260.
262
Id.
263
Id. (“Opimus Press bought the publisher Mediaworks, which had recently merged with Pannon
Lapok Társasága, which controlled numerous regional newspapers. The business weekly Figyelő, was
acquired by Mária Schmidt, a government ally. Ripost, a progovernment print tabloid, was launched in
the fall of 2016. The free daily newspaper Metropol shut down in June 2016, after it lost a contract that
had allowed its distribution at metro stations. A government-affiliated free newspaper, Lokál, soon
emerged in its place. The license of Hungary’s only national private radio station, Class FM, was not
renewed in 2016.”).
264
See Krasztev, supra note 173, at 176 (“Independent media have been relegated to the
Internet.”).
265
Marius Dragomir, The State of Hungarian Media: Endgame, MEDIA@LSE (Aug. 29, 2017),
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/2017/08/29/the-state-of-hungarian-media-endgame/.
A
second study demonstrated that in 2015, only 31 Hungarian news outlets took a pro-government stance,
but by 2018, the number increased to 500. In addition, many of these news sources were owned by
fourteen pro-Fidesz oligarchs, with Lőrinc Mészáros owning 205 media titles. Bátorfy Attila,
Infographic: Explore the Media Empire Friendly to the Hungarian Government, ATLATSZO (May 30,
2018),
https://english.atlatszo.hu/2018/01/16/infographic-explore-the-media-empire-friendly-to-thehungarian-government/.
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FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 2017, supra note 260.
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Hungarian civil society is also under siege. Like Fidesz’s strategy with
the media, the party prevents civil society from genuinely functioning by
smothering oppositional NGOs and replacing them with Fidesz allies or by
discrediting them based on their affiliation with George Soros.268 Scholars
have argued that Hungary’s “historically based tradition of a strong central
state, the restored (or rather surviving) authoritarian hierarchies . . .
successfully hindered the emergence of civil independence and
autonomy.”269 Prior to the Fidesz régime, civil society traditions in
Hungary were beginning to grow, for example, with the success of
impartial government watchdog groups.270 Many of these civil society
organizations have a high resource dependency and rely on government
grants to operate.271 Once Orbán took power in 2010, “the system of
partiality became legitimized, and grant distribution became overtly biased
as a ‘necessary restoration’ of the national and traditional value system,
which strictly excluded a number of values, critical voices, and watchdog
views.”272 In effect, the Orbán government was able to “dismiss”
opposition organizations by withdrawing funding and “replace” them with
new organizations run by Fidesz allies.273 Government Decree 49/2011
(III.30.) was enacted to achieve similar aims by ordering “direct provision
of financial support through some of the ministries to 525 organizations,
visibly recognizable from their names as NGOs that highlight national,
family, and other traditional values and share these with the government
parties.”274
Fidesz is keen to target “opponent” NGOs that are funded through
Soros’s charitable contributions and Open Society Foundations. The
Hungarian far-right perpetuates anti-Semitic myths claiming that Soros is
part of an international conspiracy to force “globalism” on unwilling
nations vis-à-vis civil society organizations.275 In 2018, Fidesz passed a
law informally known as the “Stop Soros” law that both imposes “a 25
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See infra Part IV.B for a more in-depth discussion of George Soros and Fidesz.
Ágnes Kövér, Captured by State and Church: Civil Society in Democratic Hungary, in THE
HUNGARIAN PATIENT: SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO AN ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY 81, 84 (Péter Krasztev &
Jon Van Til eds., 2015).
270
See Zsolt Enyedi, Democratic Backsliding and Academic Freedom in Hungary, 16 PERSP. ON
POL. 1067, 1070 (2018) (“These watchdogs have been critical of government practices for many years,
no matter which party was in power.”).
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Kövér, supra note 269, at 82–83.
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Id. at 83.
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Id. at 84 (“As a result, hundreds of formerly successful organizations disappeared, a process
which can be followed by searching the web, where the virtual corpses of once-flourishing NGOs are
scattered.”).
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Id. at 83–84.
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percent tax on foreign donations to NGOs that back migration” and also
criminalizes the vague practice of “promoting and supporting illegal
migration.”277 This is another instance in which the illiberal value of
absolute sovereignty appears. In a recent speech, Orbán said: “We are up
against media outlets maintained by foreign concerns and domestic
oligarchs, professional hired activists, troublemaking protest organizers,
and a chain of NGOs financed by an international speculator, summed up
by and embodied in the name George Soros.”278 We can again observe the
law and order rhetoric, similar to the anti-Roma beliefs discussed earlier,279
but this time deployed as a weapon against humanitarian aid organizations.
The rhetoric put forth by Fidesz and Prime Minister Orbán is steeped
in ethnic nationalism and easily distributed as propaganda vis-à-vis the
enormous amount of media either owned by the state or by Fidesz allies.
The content of these messages is comprised “of nationalism and Christian
and patriarchal family values with demands for law and order.”280 The
Constitution’s preamble has been revised to emphasize themes of
“Christian values, national history, and a united nation as a cultural and
political community with state interests.”281 Much of Orbán’s rhetoric
invokes notions of “the family,” both with regard to valuing the ethnic
Hungarian nuclear family282 as well as referring to the nation-state as a
276
Krisztina Than, Civil Organizations in Hungary Brace for Government Crackdown on NGOs,
REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2018, 10:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-orban-ngos/civilorganizations-in-hungary-brace-for-government-crackdown-on-ngos-idUSKBN1HW1ZN.
277
Zack Beauchamp, Hungary Just Passed a “Stop Soros” Law That Makes It Illegal to Help
Undocumented Migrants, VOX (June 22, 2018, 1:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2018/6/22/17493070/hungary-stop-soros-orban.
278
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Orbán Viktor’s Ceremonial Speech on the 170th Anniversary of
the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 (Mar. 15, 2018). Orbán then went on to claim:

[T]here are those who want to take our country from us. Not with the stroke of a
pen, has happened one hundred years ago at Trianon; now they want us to
voluntarily hand our country over to others . . . . They want us to hand it over to
foreigners coming from other continents, who do not speak our language, and who
do not respect our culture, our laws or our way of life: people who want to replace
what is ours with what is theirs. . . . Those who do not halt immigration at their
borders are lost: slowly but surely they are consumed. External forces and
international powers want to force all this upon us, with the help of their allies here
in our country.
Id.
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See supra Part II.C (discussing how “far right parties peddled ‘law and order’ narratives that
targeted the Roma”).
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András Bozóki, The Illusion of Inclusion: Configurations of Populism in Hungary,
in THINKING THROUGH TRANSITION: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, AUTHORITARIAN PASTS, AND
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER 1989, at 275, 308 (Michal Kopeček & Piotr
Wciślik eds., 2015).
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Id.
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See, e.g., Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., Speech at the 29th Bálványos Summer Open
University and Student Camp (July 29, 2018) (“Our second tenet is that every country has the right to
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family to be protected. Frequently, Orbán characterizes Hungary as a
homogenous Christian nation under siege by refugees—and that
“migration and mass population movements are bad, dangerous things
which [Hungary] want[s] no part of. . . . In consequence [of migration] we
will not be able to keep Hungary as it has been for the past 1,100 years.”284
Orbán’s speeches conjure images of the Hungarian fictive ethnicity: that of
a traditional white, Christian Magyar that embraces traditional values and
rejects the moral decline of the West. This fictive Hungarian rejects the
multiculturalism “imposed” on them by the West: “We must state that we
do not want to be diverse and do not want to be mixed: we do not want our
own colour, traditions and national culture to be mixed with those of
others. . . . We do not want to be a diverse country. We want to be how we
became 1,100 years ago here in the Carpathian Basin.”285 This fictive
ethnicity can be seen in play when a 2010 law granted citizenship rights,
including the right to vote in elections, to ethnic Hungarians living in
neighboring countries. Although many of these newly enfranchised ethnic
Hungarians have never visited the country, they account for approximately
ten percent of the electorate and vote for Fidesz at a rate of 95 percent.286
The Orbán administration is also in the process of reconstructing
Hungary’s history. The much-hated Treaty of Trianon that caused Hungary
to lose two-thirds of its territory after the First World War has become a
rallying cry for the far-right. In 2016, the central square of Pomaz, a small
town outside of Budapest, was renamed “Trianon Square” and features a
monument that is a map of greater Hungary prior to its loss of territory.287
Since Orbán’s 2010 election, the régime has sought to rewrite the nation’s
past vis-à-vis the construction of monuments that glorify what were once
defend the traditional family model, and is entitled to assert that every child has the right to a mother
and a father.”).
283
See, e.g., Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., “State of the Nation” Address (Feb. 10, 2019),
https://visegradpost.com/en/2019/02/11/prime-minister-viktor-orbans-state-of-the-nation-address-fullspeech/ (“Thirty years after the fall of communism, on the eve of a pan-European parliamentary
election, Europe finds itself in the position that we must stand up for our Hungarian identity, for our
Christian identity, protect our families and communities, and also protect our freedom. . . . We have our
own future which is the continuation of the lives of our parents and grandparents, the preservation of
the traditions of a thousand years, the protection of our economy, our families and our Christian
culture.”).
284
Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hung., Speech at the Annual General Meeting of the
Association of Cities with County Rights (Feb. 8, 2018).
285
Id.
286
See Lili Bayer, Viktor Orbán Courts Voters Beyond ‘Fortress Hungary’, POLITICO (Aug. 22,
2017), https://www.politico.eu/article/viktor-orban-courts-voters-in-transylvania-romania-hungarianelection-2018/ (“In Hungary’s 2014 election, over 95 percent of votes cast by non-domestic citizens
went to Fidesz.”).
287
Rosa Schwartzburg & Imre Szijarto, The Ghosts of a Fascist Past, JACOBIN (Jan. 26, 2019),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/01/hungary-fidesz-viktor-orban-memory-history?fbclid=IwAR0PX
U19MpJhYbFGAsoQxodTt-HP_PUjIHipRrXnZakPUj0eumF1g7dT4MA.
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considered dark times in history. These include monuments celebrating
Miklós Horthy, a right-wing leader and ally of Hitler, and the 2018
replacement of a statue of Imre Nagy, the martyred leader of the 1956
Revolution, with Gyula Gömbös, a fascist Prime Minister during the
interwar period.288 Other monuments erected under the régime downplay
Hungary’s culpability in the Holocaust.289 Orbán and Fidesz are in the
midst of constructing a new collective mythology of the nation-state,
through both legal instruments and national symbols, in order to support
their régime of illiberal democracy. Their new conception of what
constitutes a Hungarian and Hungarian values has been deployed against
intellectuals and academia in order to delegitimize their opposition and
tighten their grip on public discourse.
E. Emergency and Temporal Uncertainty in Hungarian Illiberal
Democracy
Orbán, like authoritarian leaders across the globe, received another
opportunity to consolidate power when the novel coronavirus arrived in
Hungary.290 On March 30, Parliament approved the “Corona Bill,”
allowing Orbán to indefinitely rule by decree with effectively unchecked
power.291 Under rule by decree, Orbán may bypass the national assembly
completely.292 The law granting rule by decree also stalled all elections and
created two to five year prison sentences for those that “distort facts” or
publish “false information.”293 Abuse of emergency power is not
288

Id.
Id. One such monument erected under the cover of night in Budapest’s Szabadság tér
(Freedom Square) depicts “innocent Hungary” as Archangel Gabriel being attacked by the German
imperial eagle and has been the site of a counterprotest exhibit due to the memorial’s downplaying of
Hungary’s complacency in the Holocaust. Former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány said “with this
gesture, Orbán is falsifying [history] and dishonouring all the Jewish, Roma and gay people who died
in the Holocaust.” This monument prompted thirty Jewish U.S. congressmen to pen a letter to Orbán
asking him to cancel the construction of the monument. Orbán responded to the criticism by claiming
that the memorial is “not a Holocaust memorial but a tribute to all the victims of the German
occupation.” Daniel Nolan, German Occupation Memorial Completed Under Cover of Darkness,
BUDAPEST BEACON (July 21, 2014), https://budapestbeacon.com/german-occupation-memorialcompleted-under-cover-of-darkness/.
290
WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard: Hungary, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
https://covid19.who.int/region/euro/country/hu (last accessed Oct. 30, 2020).
291
Imre Szijarto & Rosa Schwartzburg, Viktor Orbán Is Using the Coronavirus Emergency to
Crush Minorities, JACOBIN MAG. (Apr. 8, 2020), https://jacobinmag.com/2020/04/viktor-orbancoronavirus-pandemic-hungary-authoritarianism; Guy Verhofstadt, Is COVID-19 Killing Democracy?,
BALKAN INSIGHT (May 18, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/18/is-covid-19-killingdemocracy/.
292
Verhofstadt, supra note 291.
293
Edward Szekeres, Hungary ‘No Longer a Democracy’ After Coronavirus Law, BALKAN
INSIGHT (Mar. 31, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/31/hungary-no-longer-a-democracy-aftercoronavirus-law/.
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unfamiliar to Orbán. The government, for example, has renewed the state
of emergency declared for a “crisis situation due to mass migration” eight
times since the European refugee crisis began in 2015.294 Subverting the
division between emergency and normalcy serves two functions: to expand
executive authority beyond legislature oversight and to normalize the
régime. Through enduring vacillations between emergency and normalcy,
“the authorities may turn to rule by decree as easily as switching on a
lightbulb.”295
When authoritarian governments fabricate indefinite emergency,
diminished speech and protest rights often follow. For Orbán, the Corona
Bill serves as an effective mechanism to suppress speech while painting
dissenters as active threats to the health of the nation. Opposition MP
Tímea Szabó argued that in reality, the Corona Bill lends “a free hand to
do away with even what’s left of the press and practically imprison
journalists, doctors, and opposition lawmakers if we say things that you
don’t like—namely, the truth.”296 Since the “fake news” and assembly
components of the Corona Bill passed, police launched about one hundred
investigations against individuals, though cases have yet to make their way
into court.297 The Fidesz government has also instrumentalized COVID-19
precautions to limit protest and assembly. For example, protesters in a
series of car demonstrations against Orbán’s rule by decree were subjected
to extreme fines of up to 750,000 forints (about $2,500).298 Protesters were
fined under an array of charges ranging from violating traffic laws to
COVID-19 assembly restrictions.299 Under illiberal rule, official sites of

294

Edit Inotai, Pandemic-Hit Hungary Harps on About ‘Migrant Crisis’, BALKAN INSIGHT (Mar.
19, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/19/pandemic-hit-hungary-harps-on-about-migrant-crisis/;
Akos Keller-Alant, Hungarian Police Accused of Abusing Powers to Arrest Critics, BALKAN INSIGHT
(May 13, 2020), https://balkaninsight.com/2020/05/13/hungarian-police-accused-of-abusing-powers-toarrest-critics/.
295
Orsolya Lehotai, Hungary’s Democracy Is Still Under Threat, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 17, 2020),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/17/hungary-democracy-still-under-threat-orban-state-public-healthemergency-decree/.
296
Szijarto & Schwartzburg, supra note 291.
297
Keller-Alant, supra note 294. For example, the police arrested two people in rural Hungary for
criticizing Orbán’s COVID-19 response on Facebook. Id. One detainee, János Csóka-Szűcs, is disabled
and was left without transportation home after his release. Csóka-Szűcs was forced to walk home
without his cell phone or money, which were still in police custody. Id.
298
Keller-Alant, supra note 294. Szijarto notes that these fines are “several times the average
worker’s monthly income, and more than enough to cause serious difficulties even for relatively
well-off households.” Imre Szijarto, The Decline of Democracy in Hungary Is a Troubling Vision of the
Future, JACOBIN (June 14, 2020), https://jacobinmag.com/6/2020/viktor-orban-hungary-democracycovid-19.
299
Gabriella Horn, Car Honking Protests Cancelled Due to Astronomical Fines Handed Out By
Budapest Police, ATLATSZO (May 25, 2020), https://english.atlatszo.hu/2020/05/25/car-honkingprotests-cancelled-due-to-astronomical-fines-handed-out-by-budapest-police/.
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301

public discourse such as media and universities are no longer free. The
advent of COVID-19 allows illiberal leaders to restrict access to the
abstract and literal town square under the façade of public health.302
This state of public health emergency also granted Fidesz the ability to
quickly pass expansive measures unrelated to COVID-19. On March 31,
just one day after the Corona Bill passed, Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt
Semjén, introduced and passed an omnibus bill proposing fifty-seven
legislative changes.303 Although this bill was passed under the guise of
COVID-19, in reality, it functions to further consolidate power.304 First, the
bill financially enriches Orbán and his allies by ordering the construction
of Orbán’s pet projects: “the construction of new museum buildings in one
of the capital’s biggest public parks”305 and a new Budapest-Belgrade
railway.306 Second, the bill expands illiberal control over the arts by
packing the theater supervisory board with government appointees.307
Third, the bill attempted to suspend municipal autonomy.308 Finally, the
bill “forces trans people to have the same gender as they were assigned at
birth and bans gender reassignment altogether.”309 This aspect of the bill
not only functions as a literal attack against transgender Hungarians, but
also as an abstract attack against their identities.310 Denying trans existence
as deviant to the traditional heteropatriarchal norms of the Hungarian
nation-state serves to Otherize from “the people” of the imagined
community.311 This dual role of the new law serves two purposes: cast
aside trans people as non-members of the community and routinely out
them in regular aspects of national life.312

300

régime).
301

See supra notes 258–70 and accompanying text (analyzing media freedom under the Orbán

Infra Part III.
Szijarto & Schwartzburg, supra note 291.
303
Id.
304
Id.
305
Id.
306
Id.
307
Szijarto & Schwartzburg, supra note 291. Régime control over the arts is directly related to the
anti-intellectual aspect of illiberal democracies. By restricting the arts and academic freedom,
authoritarians seek to manipulate and regulate national discourse. See supra Part I.C.3.
308
This portion of the omnibus bill was reversed after extensive outcry from the opposition, “who
made significant gains in the last municipal contests in fall 2019, including [Gergely] Karácsony’s
election in Budapest” as mayor. Szijarto & Schwartzburg, supra note 291.
309
Id.
310
See Szijarto, supra note 298 (“Since Hungarian society at large is anything but trans accepting,
this move is not only an attack on trans people’s right to their ‘identities’ in an abstract sense. It is
likely to turn regular interactions with society into recurring rituals of humiliation.”).
311
Supra Part I.C.1.
312
See Szijarto, supra note 298 (“This means outing trans people not only to employers and
landlords but even to receptionists and cashiers, whenever they use a credit card.”).
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On June 16, proposed legislation ending Orbán’s rule by decree passed
unopposed.313 The Orbán government issued about one hundred decrees
since March, many of which are completely unrelated to COVID-19
measures.314 This brief reprieve would not last for long: Keeping in line
with tradition, Parliament again pushed the nation into a state of
emergency. This time, Parliament passed legislation allowing Orbán to
enter a “state of medical emergency” and revert back to rule by decree
absent a mandated end date.315 Under a state of health emergency, the
government may restrict fundamental rights for a maximum of six months,
but critics argue that they may be extended indefinitely in practice.316
The Hungarian Helsinki Committee wrote that the formal June 20 end
to rule by decree “is nothing but an optical illusion: if the Bills are adopted
in their present form, that will allow the government to again rule by
decree for an indefinite period of time, this time without even the minimal
constitutional safeguards.”317 This looming state of emergency destabilizes
any normalcy that existed before the régime. Crisis legitimizes
authoritarian control. “When the coronavirus arrived in Hungary, Orbán
used it to illustrate that he was already fully in control of his system.”318
These states of emergency are cast as an offensive against the perceived
invasions of disease or the Other319 into the imagined community.320 The
aim is that the régime citizens will more readily accept losing civil
liberties—the “liberalism”321 of the old liberal democratic order—and the
tightening authoritarian grasp will begin to feel natural. Orbán’s illiberal
democracy is emblematic of this threat. Suspended in the strings of state
313

Lehotai, supra note 295.
Shaun Walker, Hungarian Government to End Orbán’s Rule-By-Decree Legislation,
GUARDIAN (May 26, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/26/hungarian-governmentto-end-orbans-rule-by-decree-legislation-emergency-coronavirus.
315
Never-Ending Story?, HUNGARIAN HELSINKI COMMITTEE (May 27, 2020),
https://www.helsinki.hu/en/never-ending-story/. The legislation also amended the Disaster
Management Act to authorize “the government [to] order any measures it deems necessary if the
measures previously specified by parliament are inadequate.” Id.
316
Id.
317
Id.
318
Nick Schifrin & Layla Quran, How Authoritarianism Has Spread Since the Coronavirus
Pandemic Began, PBS (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/how-authoritarianism-hasspread-since-the-coronavirus-pandemic-began.
319
Edward Said’s theory of Orientalism explains that European societies Otherize non-European
societies in order to legitimize their imperialist projects. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 7 (1994)
(“Orientalism is never far from what Denys Hay has called the idea of Europe, a collective notion
identifying ‘us’ Europeans as against all ‘those’ non-Europeans, and indeed it can be argued that the
major component in European culture is precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and
outside Europe: the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the
non-European peoples and cultures.”).
320
See supra Part I.C.1 (applying Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities to illiberal
democracy).
321
See supra notes 65–73 (explaining liberal democracy and constitutional liberalism).
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emergency, the régime order reifies amorphous crises into accepted
domination. As such, after the pandemic, we emerge only to find that the
system had long collapsed, replaced by hollow illiberal democracies.
III. THE INTERSECTION OF ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM, ILLIBERAL
DEMOCRACY, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
A. Lex CEU: A Background
Central European University (CEU) is a highly-ranked graduate
research university in Budapest founded in 1991 by George Soros, Václav
Havel, and other intellectual members of the democratic opposition as a
direct response to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.322 Their vision was
to establish a university dedicated to promoting the values of open society
and democracy as envisioned in Karl Popper’s philosophy.323 Since its
founding, Central European University has been regarded as a liberal
intellectual bastion of Central Europe and Hungary. Central European
University is accredited both in Hungary and in the state of New York and
leads all other Hungarian universities in receiving European research
grants. As such, it has become the target of Prime Minister Orbán’s attacks
on freedom of thought, academic freedom, and liberal opposition.
In April of 2017, the Hungarian parliament adopted amendments to the
existing Act CCIV of 2011 on National Higher Education (“Lex CEU”).324
The new criteria for foreign universities operating in Hungary directly
targeted only Central European University.325 The most onerous
component of Lex CEU is the requirement of an international agreement
between Hungary and the university’s country of origin (in CEU’s case,
America).326 This requirement is particularly problematic as it “practically
means that the right to conduct educational activities will no longer depend
on professional criteria (e.g., on the decision of accreditation boards), but
on the preferences of the government.”327 This law also requires that all
foreign-accredited universities provide higher education services in their
country of origin and “restricts the possibility for non-European
universities to enter into cooperation with Hungarian universities.”328
322
Our Mission, CENT. EUR. U., https://www.ceu.edu/about/our-mission (last visited Jan. 12,
2020); History, CENT. EUR. U., https://www.ceu.edu/about/history (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
323
Our Mission, supra note 322.
324
This law quickly gained the nickname of “Lex CEU” because Central European University
(CEU) is the only higher education institution affected by the law.
325
Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1067.
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
Griff Witte, Amid Illiberal Revolution in Hungary, a University with U.S. Roots Fights to Stay,
WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2018, 3:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/amid-illiberal-

1232

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:3

Finally, Lex CEU “eliminates exemptions for work permits and requires
that the name of the university differs clearly from the name of already
registered universities even in foreign languages.”329 If a university fails to
comply with any aspect of Lex CEU, it will lose its license to operate.330
Although the stipulations of this amendment appear to be neutral, they
disparately impact Central European University. CEU is an
American-chartered university that is connected to the Hungarian higher
education system via a legal entity called Közép-európai Egyetem.331 The
university has a substantial population of non-European professors,
primarily from America and Canada, that relied on the recently eliminated
work permit exception.332 In order to fulfil the requirement of an
international agreement, the successful negotiation of two treaties—one
between Hungary and New York state and the other between Hungary and
the United States federal government—were now required by January 1,
2018, giving CEU less than a year to comply.333
The Orbán government faced immense backlash in response to this
absurd law. On April 2, 2017, approximately 10,000 people marched
throughout Budapest to parliament in support of CEU.334 Then, on April 4,
parliament voted in favor of Lex CEU in spite of a petition to the
government with over 30,000 signatures from 134 different countries.335
Finally, on April 9, an estimated 80,000 demonstrators took to the streets
in peaceful protest, with hundreds of international universities and over
twenty Nobel laureates expressing solidarity.336 Central European
University worked with the state of New York and launched an academic
exchange program at Bard College in Annandale-on-Hudson, New York.
Despite complying with Lex CEU and successfully negotiating a mutually
accepted draft agreement with Governor Cuomo, the Orbán government
refused to ratify the treaty. This left the university in legal limbo by
extending the deadline of compliance to January 1, 2019, prompting
international condemnation.337 Without approval by the Orbán government,
revolution-in-hungary-a-university-with-us-roots-fights-to-stay/2018/09/03/7061771c-a547-11e8-a656943eefab5daf_story.html?utm_term=.9a2aa60e3ca5; Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1067.
329
Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1067.
330
Id.
331
Id.
332
Id.
333
Id. at 1068.
334
CEU Thanks Organizers, Supporters of Today’s Event, CENT. EUR. U. (Apr. 2, 2017),
https://www.ceu.edu/node/17917.
335
Timeline of Events, CENT. EUR. U., https://www.ceu.edu/istandwithceu/timeline-events
(accessed Mar. 23, 2019).
336
Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1068.
337
Id. (“Widespread public and international criticism of the law followed. During visits to CEU
at the height of the crisis, both former German President Joachim Guack and Nobel Prize-winning
writer Mario Vargas Llosa, condemned the law. Many other public figures contributed to the growing
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the university has been forced to shutter its United States-accredited
operations in Budapest and move its students to a satellite campus in an old
state hospital on the outskirts of Vienna, Austria for the fall 2019 academic
year.338
B. Anti-Intellectualism and Illiberal Democracy: A Hungarian Reprise
Illiberal democracies, our modern authoritarianism, are deeply
anti-intellectual. As discussed in Part I, critical intellectual discourse poses
a direct threat to authoritarian control.339 Illiberal leaders like Orbán that
espouse populism in their political platform are wont to espouse
anti-intellectual rhetoric. Populism can be defined as “[a] thin-centered
ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt
elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté
générale (general will) of the people.”340 Historically, the intelligentsia
have been classified as “the elite” and have become the scapegoat for the
ire of populist leaders. Other than the general inaccessibility of expensive
university degrees to the masses, academia and its intelligentsia are
targeted to suppress anti-régime discourse and preemptively neutralize the
opposition. This line of thought makes Central European University an
ideal target for Orbán. CEU is an institution that was founded with a
worldwide protest. On April 19, nine American senators, including John McCain and Chuck Schumer,
sent a letter to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, arguing that the legislation threatens academic freedom
and calling on him to work with CEU to find a solution. The most important political statements came
from the European People’s Party (EPP, the center-right bloc in the European Parliament) and the
spokesperson for German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The U.S. State Department also expressed its
clear support for CEU and for academic freedom, and rejected the threat to an American university
abroad. . . . Parallel to American diplomatic efforts, the European Commission condemned the law as a
violation of EU regulations and core European values, including academic freedom.”); see also Letter
from Sen. Dick Durban, Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, Sen. Chris Murphy, Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand, Sen. Amy
Klobuchar, Sen. Ron Wyden, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, Sen. Cory A. Booker, Sen. Edward J. Markey,
Sen. Bernard Sanders, U.S. Senate, to Ambassador David B. Cornstein (Dec. 20, 2018) (on file with
Sen. Dick Durban) (supporting CEU and academic freedom in Hungary); Letter from Dr. Laura Schultz
et al., Professor Cognitive Sci., MIT, to H.E. Réka Szemerkényi, Ambassador of Hung. to the U.S. et
al. (Mar. 31, 2017) (on file with Central European University) (letter from 1061 cognitive scientists in
support of Central European University); Statements of Support, CENT. EUR. U.,
https://www.ceu.edu/istandwithCEU/support-statements (accessed Mar. 23, 2019).
338
CEU Forced Out of Budapest: To Launch U.S. Degree Programs in Vienna in September
2019, CENT. EUR. U. (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.ceu.edu/article/2018-12-03/ceu-forced-out-budapestlaunch-us-degree-programs-vienna-september-2019; see also Rosa Schwartzburg, School’s Out
Forever, SLATE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/authoritarians-educationuniversities-hungary-brazilpopulism.html?via=rss_socialflow_facebook&fbclid=IwAR3kYxKbgCTBPcNHo4be6f
icbi661ewsRhOgwXvdcCn2d_n3FWetNn5VBk0 (describing CEU’s ousting to Vienna).
339
ARENDT, supra note 53, at 339.
340
CAS MUDDE, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POPULISM 29 (Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al.
eds., 2017).
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dedication to open society, with programs such as their Nationalism and
Gender Studies departments341 that directly, and loudly, challenge illiberal
democracy. Universities are particularly dangerous to authoritarians
because their purpose “is [to] produce knowledge that is often critical of
the established ways of doing things . . . . And in the social sciences it’s
quite dangerous . . . because the knowledge that’s produced is calling into
question the habits and ‘ordinary ways’ that we go about doing things.”342
Likewise, the government-controlled press launched a campaign against
the “intellectual elite” that attacked philosophers associated with the Georg
Lukács School, like Ágnes Heller, by falsely claiming that they had
received overly generous government research grants.343 Authoritarians
rely on the closure of critical discourse to create a one-dimensional arena
of thought that is uncritical of the régime in order to successfully quell
opposition and maintain societal control.
Anti-intellectualism, especially in Europe, is inherently tied to
anti-Semitism. Arendt’s history of anti-Semitism in Origins of
Totalitarianism notes that European nation-states were hostile to Jewish
intellectuals in particular as an attempt to prevent Jewish assimilation in
the nineteenth century.344 But by the early twentieth century, the most
notable Central European intellectuals were Jewish: Sigmund Freud,
Edmund Husserl, Gustav Mahler, Franz Kafka, and so on.345 George Soros,
the primary founder of Central European University, is a Hungarian-born
Jewish financier and billionaire and has been the subject of anti-Semitic
conspiracy theories by the Hungarian far-right. Most recently, Fidesz has
launched a taxpayer-funded346 campaign against Soros and the European
Union that includes peddling the myth that Soros was “allegedly
341
Nationalism Studies Program, CENT. EUR. U., https://courses.ceu.edu/unit/nationalism
(accessed
Jan.
12,
2020);
Department
of
Gender
Studies,
CENT. EUR. U.,
https://courses.ceu.edu/unit/gender (accessed Jan. 12, 2020).
342
Schwartzburg, supra note 338 (quoting interview with Joan Wallach Scott, Professor Emerita
at the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study).
343
Bozóki, The Illusion of Inclusion, supra note 280, at 306.
344
ARENDT, supra note 53, at 32 (“From then on, the nation-state, equipped with conservative
arguments, drew a distinct line between Jews who were needed and wanted and those who were not.
Under the pretext of the essential Christian character of the state—what could have been more alien to
the enlightened despots!—the growing Jewish intelligentsia could be openly discriminated against
without harming the affairs of bankers or businessmen. This kind of discrimination which tried to close
the universities to Jews by excluding them from the civil services had the double advantage of
indicating that the nation-state valued special services higher than equality, and of preventing, or at
least postponing, the birth of a new group of Jews who were of no apparent use to the state and even
likely to be assimilated into society.”). Ultimately, this project was a failure: “What the nation-state had
once feared so much, the birth of a Jewish intelligentsia, now proceeded at a fantastic pace.” Id. at 52.
345
Kundera, The Tragedy of Central Europe, supra note 143, at 35.
346
Lili Bayer, Hungary Launches Campaign Targeting Jean-Claude Juncker, POLITICO (Feb. 18,
2019),
https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-launches-campaign-targeting-jean-claude-junckergeorge-soros/.
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347

responsible for the wave of migrants to Europe.” Deputy Prime Minister
Zsolt Semjén claimed in a recent radio interview that: “[T]he Soros-type
extreme liberalism which hates Christian traditions and, if possible even
more, nation states,”348 is dangerous to Hungarians, and he went on to
conclude that “leftist and liberal parties needed to import millions of
foreigners in order to defeat their nationalist opponents and, in cooperation
with immigrant Islamic forces, to rule the nations of Europe.”349 Jobbik
spokesman Ádám Mirkóczki pushed this narrative even further by
claiming that high-ranking Fidesz politicians, including Orbán, are
implicated in this conspiracy theory due to the Soros funding that they
received for their educations.350 The anti-Soros conspiracy theory directly
entered the parliamentary debate on Lex CEU when “the minister
responsible for education stated that ‘we are committed to use all legal
means at our disposal to stop pseudo-civil society spy groups such as the
ones funded by George Soros.’”351 Although Central European University
would still have been a likely target of the Fidesz régime, Soros’s
involvement threw fuel into the fire.
C. Illiberal Legal Challenges to Academic Freedom
Since Prime Minister Viktor Orbán was elected in 2010, the Fidesz
government has centralized education and enacted a wide array of laws that
shrink academic freedom in the country.352 Fidesz has pushed through a
gradual overhaul of the public education system, slowly growing
government influence over school curricula.353 In 2014, legislation was
adopted that permits government-appointed chancellors to make significant
financial decisions at public universities,354 and in some cases, the Minister
of Education has even “imposed his own candidate for rector of
universities and political appointees without any academic record were
promoted to professorship at state-controlled universities.”355 Likewise, a
slash in government funding for the Hungarian Academy of Science and
347

Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1069.
Id.
349
Id. (summarizing the Semjén interview).
350
Fidesz Gets a Reminder Who Was Funded By George Soros, JOBBIK (Jan. 27, 2017),
https://www.jobbik.com/fidesz_gets_a_reminder_who_was_funded_by_george_soros (“He added that
when Szilárd Németh identified Soros’ protégés as organizations and individuals to be ‘cleaned away’,
the Fidesz politician forgot to mention that from 1984 through 1994 the Hungarian-born US
businessman funded such persons as PM Viktor Orbán and several other individuals with ties to the
current government or the ruling party, including Tamás Deutsch, József Szájer, Zsolt Németh, István
Stumpf, Zoltán Cséfalvay, József Pálinkás, János Áder or László Kövér.”).
351
Enyedi, supra note 270, at 1070.
352
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353
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355
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general reallocation of significantly less funds for academic research
institutions threatens institutional closures in the near future.356 Fidesz
leveraged the Corona Bill to forcibly transfer control over the University of
Theater and Film Arts (SZFE) to a private foundation, prompting students
to occupy campus buildings, professors to resign, and tens of thousands to
protest in Budapest.357 The battle for academic freedom in Hungary has
manifested itself as a culture war between the nationalistic illiberal
democracy and the liberal intelligentsia.
At the same time that the Orbán government refused to acknowledge
Central European University’s compliance with Lex CEU, Prime Minister
Orbán signed a decree revoking accreditation and funding for gender
studies departments, effectively banning the discipline.358 This decree only
targets programs from two universities in Hungary: Central European
University and Eötvös Loránd University.359 Effective immediately, the
accreditation of all gender studies programs has been revoked, although the
government is allowing currently enrolled students to finish their
programs. Anti-intellectual and misogynistic rhetoric surrounding the
gender studies ban date back to Fidesz’s seizure of power. In 2015, László
Kövér, one of the founders of Fidesz, stated:
We don’t want the gender craziness. We don’t want to make
Hungary a futureless society of man-hating women, and
feminine men living in dread of women, and considering
families and children only as barriers to self-fulfillment …
And we would like if our daughters would consider, as the

356
Szabó András Péter, Greetings from the Sinking Boat of Hungarian Academia, INDEX (trans.
Zoltán Kovács, Feb. 8, 2019), https://index.hu/english/2019/02/08/greetings_from_the_sinking_boat
_of_hungarian_academia/.
357
See supra Part II.F (discussing the Corona Bill and Hungarian states of emergency). SZFE is a
prestigious 155-year-old university that has educated prominent Hungarian artists. In March, the Fidesz
government passed the Corona Bill, which included a provision “that transferred ownership of the
public university to a private foundation. The government also appointed a new board of trustees—
actions that raised fears that the university, long a target of the government, will be forced to hew more
closely to Mr. Orban’s nationalistic and conservative vision for Hungary.” Benjamin Novak, Student
Blockade Protests Viktor Orban’s Reach at a Top Arts University, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/06/world/europe/hungary-students-blockade-orban.html. At the
time of writing, the students have refused to end their occupation “until [they] are guaranteed the
university’s autonomy.” Hungarian Students, Artists Protest Government’s Takeover of Famed Film
School, RADIO FREE EUR./RADIO LIBERTY’S HUNGARIAN SERV. (Oct. 19, 2020),
https://www.rferl.org/a/hungarian-students-artists-protest-government-s-takeover-of-famed-filmschool/30901261.html (internal quotations omitted).
358
Anna Zsubori, Gender Studies Banned at University—the Hungarian Government’s Latest
Attack on Equality, CONVERSATION (Oct. 9, 2018), http://theconversation.com/gender-studies-bannedat-university-the-hungarian-governments-latest-attack-on-equality-103150.
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highest quality of self-fulfillment, the possibility of giving
birth to our grandchildren.360
Kövér went even further earlier that year to argue that “‘genderism’ is
‘an intellectual founding of such a human experiment that is nothing better
than, let’s say, eugenics in Nazi times.’”361 It is obvious that the
government’s decision to ban certain academic fields—and compare them
to Nazism—stems not from a genuine desire to improve the academic
endeavors of universities but to control freedom of thought based on
political ideology. Nationalist populist movements tend to yearn for a
return to “traditional” society and reject modernism, and as such, embrace
“traditional” gender roles.362 Hungary is a very patriarchal country invested
in traditional family structures,363 and Fidesz’s politics “signals opposition
to the moral-cultural transformation of developed societies.”364 The gender
studies ban is emblematic of the culture war between the Fidesz
government and Central European University. The ban primarily affects
Central European University, an institution that is one of the most diverse
universities in the world365 and embodies the spirit of open society,
multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism. Accordingly, the ban, and its
targeting of CEU, functions as the Fidesz government’s rebuke of the
moral decline366 of the West. Academic institutions in other illiberal
democracies have experienced similar treatment, especially with regard to
teaching gender studies and other related subjects.367 This war on academia
360
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is not only ideological, but wrapped up in the very legal institutions of
Hungary. Further, Lex CEU flies in the face of the Hungarian Constitution,
which purports to protect academic freedom from government intrusion,
and is a reminder of the hollowness of democratic institutions in illiberal
democracies.368
Orbán and Fidesz’s attacks on Central European University exemplify
illiberal democratic principles in action. As has been demonstrated, the
majoritarian Fidesz partocracy quickly seized control of all government
organs, including purportedly independent ones, in order to bypass all
opposition checks in every stage of the democratic process. Fidesz’s reach
has extended beyond democratic institutions to control virtually all
mainstream media and restrict the operation of civil society to further
insulate the régime from opposition.369 In addition to manipulating the law,
they are controlling societal norms to produce the Magyar fictive ethnicity
and suppress non-conservative discourse.370 At the same time, Hungarian
history is actively being rewritten in a manner that glorifies past fascist
leaders and stokes anger over the perceived injustices of the Treaty of
Trianon.371 Orbán invokes principles of absolute sovereignty when he
known as Academics for Peace. A number of these signatories are facing between one and five years’
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treats Central European University as yet another invasion of the West and
its “degenerate” ideology and paints Hungary as a nation that is still being
constantly invaded, this time by liberals under George Soros’s watch.372
Orbán has also deployed the “dictatorship of law” when passing Lex CEU
as a direct assault on the “elite intelligentsia” that, through critical
discourse and academia, threaten the legitimacy of the illiberal
democracy.373 Far-right nationalist and anti-intellectual rhetoric
characterizes Central European University and its intellectuals as a danger
to “the people” of Hungary, pitting them against each other in a culture war
that CEU did not sign up for.
While the situation in Hungary is grim, action can be taken.
Individuals can continue to protest Fidesz’s régime and draw international
attention to Hungary. Right now, “activists on the ground are setting up
underground education lectures and organizing queer theory readings and
poetry nights in people’s living rooms and basement bars.”374 Independent
media and the academic community can further support democracy and
academic freedom by publicizing the situation in Hungary and supporting
communities and individuals under threat. Likewise, the international
community can pressure illiberal democracies through diplomatic
measures. Political and economic unions such as the European Union can
adopt measures condemning the actions of illiberal democratic states and
impose sanctions on noncompliant governments. On September 12, 2018,
the European Union voted to pursue disciplinary action against Hungary
under Article 7 of the European Union Charter. This is the first time that
the EU has pursued action invoking Article 7, which lays out the ways that
EU bodies can act if a member state violates the core values of the
European Union.375 On March 20, 2019, the European People’s Party376
suspended Fidesz from the party in response to their campaign attacking
Soros and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, as well
as its actions against Central European University. EPP President Joseph
Daul stated: “We cannot compromise on democracy, rule of law, freedom
of press, academic freedom or minorities’ rights. And anti-EU rhetoric is
372
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unacceptable. The divergences between EPP and Fidesz must cease.”377
Fidesz must end the anti-Junker and Soros campaign, solve the legal
dispute over Central European University, and “recognize the damage it
caused and refrain from similar action”378 in order to regain full
membership to the EPP. As a result from pressure by the EPP, on March
20, Orbán and Prime Minister Söder of Bavaria exchanged letters
supporting a partnership between CEU and the Technical University of
Munich on the condition that CEU be allowed to remain in Budapest.379 At
the time of writing, Orbán has yet to give CEU a legal guarantee to remain
in operation and “an international agreement guaranteeing the freedom of
CEU to operate in Budapest as a US degree granting institution”380 is
needed before celebration. If Central European University is ultimately
successful, it will be a testament to the sway of influence that European
institutions still hold over this illiberal democracy. Even if Central
European University is allowed to remain in Budapest, Hungary’s
democratic institutions are still under siege and many other liberties
enshrined under constitutional liberalism are still threatened.
CONCLUSION
We are currently in the throes of Huntington’s third reverse wave.
After decades of democratic prosperity, global democracy has entered a
“decade of decline.”381 Between 2006 and 2016, Freedom House’s
Freedom in the World report discovered that 105 countries suffered net
declines in their scores, while 61 demonstrated improvement. Given these
grim statistics, we have undoubtedly entered Huntington’s third reverse
wave. Based on the first and second reverse waves, Huntington concluded
that each reverse wave will give rise to a new form of authoritarianism.
Illiberal democracy is that form of authoritarianism.
Illiberal democracy differs from other forms of authoritarianism due to
the fact that some semblance of a democratic system remains. In many
cases, the authoritarian government comes to power through the
democratic process. However, once elected, they quickly consolidate
control, and greatly weaken democracy and the safeguards of civil liberties
377
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as guaranteed by constitutional liberalism. These régimes tend to value
majoritarianism, absolute sovereignty, and the dictatorship of law while
embracing nationalism and anti-intellectualism. When illiberal
democracies operate under these values that run counter to the very nature
of democracy, their democratic institutions become hollow and operate in
name only. At the same time, illiberal democracies fail to protect the
individual with liberties typically ascribed to constitutional liberalism and
instead value the perceived needs of the community. This definition of
community, however, is guided by nationalism. Illiberal democratic
leaders determine which citizens are worthy of belonging to their imagined
community—and thus the nation-state—through fictive ethnicity and
national mythologies. For populist leaders like Orbán, “elite” intellectuals,
non-ethnic Magyars, and the opposition are not welcome. Intellectuals
pose a specific threat to authoritarians because critical discourse threatens
to destabilize their régimes. Taken together, we can begin to recognize the
warning signs of an illiberal democracy.
Huntington’s second generalization is particularly interesting as
applied to Hungary’s illiberal democracy and is worth expanding.
Huntington contends that transitions from democracy to authoritarianism
tend to take place either through a military coup d’état or through an
executive coup whereby a head of government concentrates power in the
executive by declaring a state of emergency or instituting martial law. As
opposed to concentrating power on an individual executive, Hungary’s
partocracy has concentrated Fidesz’s power. Fidesz controls all three
branches of government, independent government institutions, and the
media, and while strangling civil society and academia. And, not a single
action Fidesz has taken has been illegal under national law. Therefore,
Huntington’s second generalization should be expanded to include the
centralization of power by a group or party.
Finally, the large majority of Huntington’s factors under the first
generalization have manifested themselves in Hungarian illiberal
democracy. During the period of democratic transition, political scandals,
majoritarianism, and partocracy weakened public regard for democratic
values. Instability was intensified during this period due to the numerous
economic crises experienced during Hungary’s transition to capitalism and
in the 2008 economic recession. Third, the country is politically polarized,
in part due to partocracy, the failures of MSZP, and Orbán’s inflammatory
rhetoric. Fourth, MSZP’s missteps pushing through austerity measures and
other initiatives that were unpopular with the general public fueled populist
desires. Fifth, the use of law and order rhetoric, first with regard to the
Roma and then the refugee crisis, has sparked ethno-nationalist sentiments
and moved racist discourse into the political mainstream. Sixth, Hungary’s
long history of occupation by nondemocratic régimes and the dramatic loss
of territory resulting from the Treaty of Trianon, strengthened calls for
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absolute sovereignty. Now, Fidesz has identified the European Union,
“Western values,” and George Soros as the next invaders. Finally, the
illiberal democratic régime has snowballed and propagated itself both in
neighboring nation-states and internationally.
Hungary’s polarized political condition is exemplified in the clash
between Orbán and Central European University. This clash pits Central
European University—a symbol of Western liberalism and
cosmopolitanism—against Orbán’s ethno-nationalist illiberal democracy.
Other attacks on academic freedom, like the gender studies ban, slashed
funding for research institutions, and campaigns against the Hungarian
intelligentsia, demonstrate the serious threat that is posed to not only
academic freedom in Hungary, but also academic freedom globally as
illiberal democracies spread. There is some hope, however. Central
European University’s ousting caught international attention, prompting
criticism and solidarity from individuals, academia, powerful politicians,
and government institutions. Orbán experienced severe backlash from the
European Union for his actions—facing Article 7 disciplinary
proceedings—as well as from the conservative European People’s Party
that suspended Fidesz from the party. The European People’s Party’s
actions even went so far as to prompt a dialogue between Orbán and EPP
leaders that may result in the university being permitted to stay in Budapest
and remain U.S. accredited.
For some reason, academic freedom in Hungary has received immense
international attention that has been critical in CEU’s fight to exist in
Hungary. Perhaps academia is more alluring than amendments to
parliamentary procedure or executive power. Perhaps the international
community still holds high regard for universities. Or perhaps people have
rallied around Central European University for another reason. If CEU is
successful, the outcome could provide us with a potential strategy to
protecting academic freedom in Hungary and in other illiberal
democracies, and even allow us to glean perspective on how illiberal
democracies operate.

